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Summary Table 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -1.2 -0.8 1.1 2.0 2.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure -2.1 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 
Investment 5.0 -2.4 11.3 12.5 9.2 
Exports 4.7 1.1 12.6 5.1 4.5 
Imports 6.9 0.6 13.2 4.4 4.6 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -0.3 0.2 4.8 4.4 3.7 
Gross National Product (GNP) 1.1 3.3 5.2 4.2 3.6 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
    
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.0 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 0.9 2.4 0.0 1.0 1.0 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Labour Market 
    
 
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,843 1,880 1,914 1,961 2,014 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 316 282 243 208 183 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 14.7 13.0 11.3 9.6 8.3 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Public Finance 
    
 
General Government Balance (€ bn) -14.1 -10.2 -7.6 -4.7 -2.6 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -8.1 -5.8 -4.1 -2.3 -1.2 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 121.7 123.2 109.7 104.9 99.1 
 
    
 
  
    
 
External Trade 
    
 
Balance of Payments Current Account (€ bn) 1.5 6.6 10.5 13.6 16.4 
Current Account (% of GNP) 1.0 4.5 6.6 7.9 9.0 
 
    
 
 
    
 
Demand 
    
 
Final Demand 2.4 0.5 8.8 4.4 4.1 
Domestic Demand -0.6 -0.3 3.6 3.4 3.6 
Domestic Demand (excl. Stocks) -0.2 -0.7 2.9 3.9 3.7 
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National Accounts 2014 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 83.3 85.6 2.7 1.6 1.1 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.0 26.8 3.4 3.2 0.1 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 26.5 30.4 14.5 2.9 11.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 184.1 207.8 12.9 0.3 12.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.8 1.8 
   Final Demand 320.7 352.5 9.9 1.0 8.8
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services 147.7 168.1 13.8 0.6 13.2 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.8 1.9 
   
GDP at Market Prices 174.8 186.3 6.6 1.7 4.8 
Net Factor Payments -27.3 -27.0 
   
GNP at Market Prices 147.5 159.3 8.0 2.7 5.2 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.1 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 71.9 73.1 1.3 1.8 
Other 61.1 69.5 8.4 13.7 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.8 -1.9 
  Net Domestic Product 134.8 144.4 9.6 7.1
Net Factor Payments -27.3 -27.0 0.3 -1.1 
National Income 107.5 117.5 9.9 8.4 
Depreciation 23.7 24.0 0.3 1.4 
GNP at Factor Cost 131.2 141.5 10.3 7.8 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.3 17.8 1.5 9.4 
GNP at Market Prices 147.5 159.3 11.8 8.0 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 36.4 39.7 3.3 
F -27.3 -27.0 0.3 
Net Transfers -2.5 -2.3 0.2 
Balance on Current Account 6.6 10.5 3.9 
as % of GNP 4.5 6.6 2.4 
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National Accounts 2015 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 85.6 89.1 4.0 2.0 2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.8 28.3 5.5 4.9 0.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 30.4 35.0 15.3 2.4 12.5 
Exports of Goods and Services 207.8 221.7 6.7 1.5 5.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.8 1.0 
   Final Demand 352.5 375.1 6.4 1.9 4.4
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  168.1 176.8 5.2 0.8 4.4 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.9 1.9 
   
GDP at Market Prices 186.3 200.2 7.5 2.9 4.4 
Net Factor Payments  -27.0 -28.9 
   
GNP at Market Prices 159.3 171.3 7.5 3.2 4.2 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.1 3.2 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 73.1 75.8 2.7 3.7 
Other 69.5 78.6 9.1 13.1 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.9 -1.9 
  Net Domestic Product 144.4 156.3 11.8 8.2
Net Factor Payments -27.0 -28.9 -1.9 7.1 
National Income 117.5 127.4 9.9 8.4 
Depreciation 24.0 25.0 1.0 4.2 
GNP at Factor Cost 141.5 152.4 10.9 7.7 
Taxes less Subsidies 17.8 18.9 1.1 6.0 
GNP at Market Prices 159.3 171.3 12.0 7.5 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 39.7 44.9 5.2 
F -27.0 -28.9 -1.9 
Net Transfers -2.3 -2.4 -0.1 
Balance on Current Account 10.5 13.6 3.1 
as % of GNP 6.6 7.9 1.8 
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National Accounts 2016 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 89.1 93.0 4.4 2.0 2.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.3 28.8 1.8 1.1 0.7 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 35.0 39.3 12.2 2.8 9.2 
Exports of Goods and Services 221.7 235.9 6.4 1.9 4.5 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.0 1.0 
   Final Demand 375.1 398.1 6.1 1.9 4.1
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  176.8 186.5 5.4 0.8 4.6 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.9 1.9 
   
GDP at Market Prices 200.2 213.5 6.7 2.9 3.7 
Net Factor Payments  -28.9 -30.6 
   
GNP at Market Prices 171.3 182.9 6.8 3.0 3.6 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.3 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 75.8 78.8 2.9 3.9 
Other 78.6 86.2 7.6 9.7 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.9 -1.9 
  Net Domestic Product 156.3 166.9 10.7 6.8
Net Factor Payments -28.9 -30.6 -1.7 5.9 
National Income 127.4 136.3 9.0 7.0 
Depreciation 25.0 26.5 1.5 6.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 152.4 162.8 10.5 6.9 
Taxes less Subsidies 18.9 20.1 1.2 6.2 
GNP at Market Prices 171.3 182.9 11.6 6.8 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 44.9 49.5 4.6 
F -28.9 -30.6 -1.7 
Net Transfers -2.4 -2.5 -0.1 
Balance on Current Account 13.6 16.4 2.8 
as % of GNP 7.9 9.0 1.5 
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The Irish Economy - Forecast Overview and Summary 
 
Most recent economic data confirm that the Irish economy is likely to register 
significant growth in 2015. In a continuation of indicative trends from 2014, 
receipts of taxation aggregates are still registering strong growth in Q1 2015. In 
particular, returns for pay related social insurance (PRSI) confirm the positive 
trends in the Irish labour market where unemployment, at 9.9 per cent, is now at 
its lowest rate since January 2009.  
 
While economic activity in both the UK and the US was below expected levels for 
Q1 2015, it would appear that there is some modest pick-up in the performance 
of the Euro Area. In Ireland, recent sentiment data suggest continued 
improvement in consumer attitudes, notwithstanding the still sizeable levels of 
household debt evident in the economy. House prices continue to register strong 
annual growth with an average rate of almost 15 per cent for Q1 2015. While 
there are signs that housing construction may not be as significant in 2015 as we 
had initially expected, overall investment is still set to contribute significantly to 
growth this year. 
 
Given the strong increases in house prices we also provide new estimates for the 
scale of negative equity in the Irish mortgage market. Following work by Duffy 
(2014)1, we estimate the number of mortgages in negative equity will have fallen 
by almost 50 per cent from its peak at the end of 2012 to 161,000 mortgages in 
2014.  
 
Estimates from the nowcasting model, presented in more detail in the Appendix 
to the Commentary, indicate that the economy grew by approximately 1 per cent 
between Q1 2015 and Q2 2015. We also use the nowcasting model to quantify 
the impact of ‘contract manufacturing’, a phenomenon which attracted 
significant attention in Q4 2014. 
 
Overall, therefore, we see no reason to change our growth rate forecast of 4 per 
cent for GNP in 2015 and 3.5 per cent in 2016. As we argued in the Spring 
                                                          
1
  See Duffy, D. (2014). “Updated estimates on the extent of negative equity in the Irish housing market”, Research 
Note, 2014/2/1, ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary.  
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Commentary, these growth rates, the strongest in Europe, would bring the 
economy in line with its potential level by the end of 2016. This has significant 
implications for the budgetary policy. 
 
To that end, we comment on the fiscal targets/forecasts outlined recently in the 
Government’s Spring Economic Statement. While this process brings a welcome 
degree of clarity and transparency to fiscal and macroeconomic policy-making, 
the clear commitment to run an expansionary budgetary policy in 2016 is not in 
keeping with a counter-cyclical approach in this area.  
 
We devote some attention in this Commentary to issues concerning the 
interpretation of the Irish National Accounts. The Special Article by FitzGerald 
examines five elements which pose difficulties in interpreting the Irish National 
Accounts, while the Research Note by Conroy updates previous estimates of the 
volatility of quarterly Irish National Accounts. 
 
The Research Note by Duffy, Morley and Watson examines developments in the 
KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index. Finally, the Research Note by 
McQuinn and Morley provides an updated assessment of the standard variable 
rate (SVR) issue and the continued breakdown which is evident in the relationship 
between the European Central Bank (ECB) policy rate and the SVR in the Irish 
mortgage market.  
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The International Economy 
 
Since the Spring Commentary, the economic performances of Ireland’s main 
trading partners have proved mixed. A range of indicators for the Euro Area, 
including National Accounts, showed that output growth picked up somewhat in 
the first quarter. Nonetheless, significant downside risks to European growth, as 
outlined in McQuinn and Whelan (2015),2 still remain. In the United States and 
United Kingdom, first quarter growth was weak, being outstripped by growth in 
the Euro Area. As shall be discussed further below, it is possible that problems in 
measuring US GDP have played a large part in the reported low growth from the 
start of 2015. As a result, at this point, we do not see any significant impact on 
Irish exports to the United States due to the slower than expected growth rates. 
 
Figure 1 shows forecast growth in Ireland’s main trading partners. Consensus 
growth forecasts for the Euro Area have been revised upwards since the start of 
the year. Real GDP is now forecast to grow by 1.4 per cent and 1.7 per cent in 
2015 and 2016, respectively. Since the Spring Commentary, there have been 
slight downgrades to growth forecasts for the US and UK. The US is forecast to 
grow by 2.9 per cent in 2015 and in 2016, while the UK is forecast to grow by 2.6 
per cent and 2.3 per cent respectively. 
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% change, year-on-year) 
               Euro Area               United States             United Kingdom 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
                                                          
2
  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan (2015). “Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms”, 
University College Dublin Working Paper. 
Actual outturn Forecast range Actual outturn and median of forecasts
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The Euro Area Economy 
In the first quarter, real GDP grew by 0.4 per cent quarter-on-quarter in both the 
Euro Area and in the European Union as a whole. Both Italy and France had 
stronger growth than had been expected, at 0.3 per cent and 0.6 per cent 
respectively, while the Spanish economy grew by 0.9 per cent. Germany grew by 
less than had been expected; at 0.3 per cent quarter-on-quarter. Only two 
countries in the European Union were in recession in the first quarter of 2015; 
Greece and Finland.3 Overall, therefore, most recent macroeconomic indicators, 
including GDP growth rates for Europe, support a stronger growth outlook for 
2015 than had been previously expected. 
 
As noted in the Spring Commentary, monetary statistics from the ECB have begun 
to show a recovery in economic growth. Money supply growth, as measured by 
annual growth in M3, increased to 4.6 per cent in March from 4 per cent in 
February. Growth in loans to the private sector has been, and remains, subdued 
but has begun to gradually improve. 
 
In April, the ECB chose to keep its key interest rates unchanged, with the main 
refinancing rate and the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the 
deposit facility at 0.05 per cent, 0.30 per cent and -0.20 per cent respectively. ECB 
President Mario Draghi confirmed that purchase volumes for the Quantitative 
Easing (QE) programme are in line with the announced €60 billion per month. 
Furthermore Mr. Draghi highlighted recent improvements in the cost of finance 
and in borrowing conditions for firms and households in the Euro Area. This is 
one channel through which QE should operate: by supporting consumption and 
investment, QE leads to demand growth which speeds the absorption of spare 
capacity in the economy and leads to inflation. Another important QE channel 
relates to exchange rates: the Euro’s recent depreciation has benefited the 
international competitiveness of the Euro Area and, in particular, for exporting 
nations such as Ireland. 
 
Annual inflation in the Euro Area was 0 per cent in April 2015, increasing from       
-0.1 per cent in March. Inflation was 0.7 per cent in April 2014. The most recent 
data available show that negative annual inflation rates were observed in 12 of 
the 28 EU Member States, while six more had zero inflation. As noted in a 
number of recent Commentaries, energy prices have been the main driver of 
falling inflation. Excluding energy prices, annual inflation was 0.7 per cent in April 
2015. It is worth noting that there will be a base effect in the inflation rate toward 
                                                          
3
  Nine of 28 Member States have not yet reported National Accounts for the first quarter. Ireland was among these 
countries. 
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the latter part of 2015; 12 months after the fall in energy prices, the steep decline 
will no longer influence annual inflation rates. Furthermore, with oil prices set to 
rise moderately again, energy prices can be expected to add to inflation rates 
once more. The lower level of oil prices, however, should continue to support 
consumption growth through household personal disposable income. 
 
While the outlook for Europe has improved recently, downside risks continue to 
exist. There are numerous legacy issues from the crisis, including very high 
unemployment rates which are unlikely to unwind quickly. The continuing Greek 
crisis also provides a downside risk. The lengthy negotiations between Greece 
and its creditors have not yet reached any resolution, with increasing fears of a 
default and the threat of a ‘Grexit’. The Greek banking system has undergone a 
significant deposit flight and is heavily reliant on Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
from the ECB. While a deal between Greece and its institutional partners would 
appear feasible, it has yet to come to fruition. 
 
Given the size and importance of the German economy, the European 
Commission (2015)4 highlights the need to reduce the risk of adverse effects of 
Germany’s Balance of Payments Current Account surplus on both the German 
and European economies. In 2014, the surplus amounted to 7.9 per cent of GDP, 
in excess of the 6 per cent limit set out under the European Commission’s 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). While some efforts have been made 
to address this situation, the surplus is still large and persistent, with IMF (2014)5 
noting that the Current Account has been in surplus since 2002 and the average 
surplus exceeds 6 per cent of GDP. Furthermore, the IMF assesses that the 
surplus is between 3 and 6 percentage points of GDP higher than ‘the value 
implied by fundamentals and desired policies’.  
 
The Current Account surplus reflects weak domestic demand and an increasing 
trade balance in the German economy. The domestic demand component 
reflects years of low levels of public and private investment, accompanied by high 
levels of savings. As such, the German and European economies would reap 
growth benefits from stimulating domestic demand via investment, as well as 
from a more expansive fiscal policy. The surplus also reflects a trade balance 
which hampers growth elsewhere in Europe, particularly in peripheral countries. 
This year the European Commission found that five Member States6 had 
‘excessive imbalances’, although Germany was not one of these. 
                                                          
4
  European Commission (2015), “Council Recommendation on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Germany”. 
5
  IMF (2014), “2014 Pilot External Sector Report - Individual Economy Assessments”. 
6
  These states were Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Italy and Portugal. 
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The US Economy 
The US economy grew by 0.2 per cent in real terms, quarter-on-quarter, in the 
first quarter of 2015. Domestic demand grew quite strongly, with personal 
consumption increasing by just under 2 per cent in the quarter and investment 
growing by 3.4 per cent. The trade balance worsened significantly, however, with 
exports falling by 7.2 per cent and imports rising by 1.8 per cent. It is likely that 
the strengthening of the US Dollar over the last year is reflected in this impact of 
net trade on GDP. The Dollar is expected to remain strong throughout 2015, 
which should also continue to support the relative competitiveness of Irish 
exports. 
 
Real GDP growth of 0.2 per cent represents a significantly weaker outturn for real 
GDP growth than the 2.2 per cent growth of the fourth quarter. Over recent 
years, a pattern has been noted in which the National Accounts for the United 
States produce a weak first quarter, despite seasonal adjustment which should 
largely account for weather and other relevant seasonal factors. The Federal 
Reserve Banks of San Francisco and Philadelphia have produced research7 on this 
phenomenon. They show that, even after the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
performs seasonal adjustment in producing the National Accounts, there remains 
residual seasonality. Further correcting for seasonality, the authors estimate a 
quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rate of 1.8 per cent in the first quarter, which 
would be closer to the trend growth in the US economy. As such, we view it as 
unlikely that US economic growth has weakened significantly in 2015 and do not 
expect there to be a negative impact on Irish exports to the United States. 
 
At its April meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reaffirmed its 
view that the target range for the federal funds rate of 0 per cent to 0.25 per cent 
was appropriate. The FOMC again emphasised that it is waiting for further signs 
of improvement in the labour market and for further confidence that inflation is 
returning to target before an interest rate increase. Market expectations 
currently have the first increase in interest rates coming in late 2015, with further 
increases over the next three years to 1.75 per cent. These expectations are little 
changed since the Spring Commentary. In March, inflation in the United States 
was 0.2 per cent year-on-year. This was largely driven by an annual decrease of 
                                                          
7
  Rudebusch, G. D., D. Wilson and T. Mahedy (2015). “The Puzzle of Weak First-Quarter GDP Growth”, Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter. 
   Stark, T. (2015). “First Quarters in the National Income and Product Accounts”, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Special Report. 
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18.3 per cent in energy prices. Excluding energy prices from the Consumer Price 
Index, inflation was 1.8 per cent in March. 
 
With reference to its maximum employment mandate, the FOMC highlighted a 
lack of improvement in labour market indicators in its assessment of the US 
economy. Over recent months there has been a moderation in the pace of job 
growth, with a monthly average increase of 184,000 in Non-farm Payroll 
employment. This was the weakest quarterly employment growth since the 
second quarter of 2013, while employment growth of 85,000 in March was the 
weakest monthly employment figure since June 2012. The unemployment rate in 
the United States remained steady in April at 5.4 per cent but has fallen from 6.2 
per cent in April 2014. The labour force participation rate remained unchanged at 
62.8 per cent in April, near historic lows. The participation rate has varied only 
within a band of 62.7 per cent to 62.9 per cent over the last year. Since the Spring 
Commentary, there does not appear to have been any further easing of the 
labour under-utilisation problem to which the FOMC regularly points. 
 
Recent research8 into the declining US participation rate points to a number of 
causes. Population ageing has contributed to a long-term downward trend in 
participation, mainly due to retirement. Retirement is also affected by cyclical 
factors, however, with retirements delayed during the recession and being 
realised in the subsequent recovery. There has also been a long-term trend 
increase in non-participation due to disability, with the likelihood of returning to 
the labour force from this status being low. During the recession, there was a 
significant increase in discouragement among potential members of the labour 
force. This has been slow to dissipate post-recession, with the latest Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data showing that the numbers of discouraged workers and those 
marginally attached to the labour force have decreased little over the last year. 
 
The UK Economy 
Real GDP in the United Kingdom grew by 2.8 per cent in 2014. This compared 
favourably with the rest of the European Union and among G7 nations. A more 
careful examination of the United Kingdom’s recent economic history, however, 
suggests certain negative underlying trends in the post-crisis era. In particular, 
growth in GDP per capita and productivity have performed badly in this period.9 
                                                          
8
  Fujita, S. (2014). “On the Causes of Declines in the Labor Force Participation Rate”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia Special Report. 
9
  See, for instance, Kirby, S., O. Carreras, J. Meaning, R. Piggott, and J. Warren (2015). “Prospects for the UK Economy”, 
National Institute Economic Review, No. 232, May 2015. 
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Looking forward, also, the prospects for growth in the UK economy appear to be 
pessimistic, especially given the likely future path of productivity. 
 
While GDP has grown by approximately 4 per cent since 2007, the UK population 
grew by 5 per cent over the same period. As such, GDP per capita remains 1 per 
cent below its pre-recession peak, with no improvement in average living 
standards in the UK over this seven-year period. This represents the longest 
duration in falling living standards since data collection began in 1955. 
Productivity has been stagnant since the recession, with labour growth (via 
growth in the employment rate) being the driver of overall economic growth. 
 
As one of Ireland’s main trading partners, economic growth in the United 
Kingdom is of great importance to Irish economic performance and impacts on 
our forecasts. McQuinn and Whelan (2015)10 argue that the overall outlook for 
the UK is negative over the medium term. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
significant productivity-enhancing reforms are available to the UK. With the 
unemployment rate low and the employment rate high and unlikely to rise 
further, there is limited ability for labour growth to continue to provide a boost to 
growth in GDP over the medium term and the UK appears set to experience weak 
growth. 
 
Fiscal policy looks set to continue to provide a drag on growth. The new 
Conservative government has pledged a five-year austerity programme, with the 
adjustment set to be of similar magnitude to that of the previous Parliament. 
Should the plans come to fruition, the share of government expenditure in GDP 
would be 34 per cent by 2020, the smallest since the end of the Second World 
War. 
 
A risk to growth in both the United Kingdom and in Ireland comes from the 
referendum on EU membership, to be held before the end of 2017, to which the 
incoming Government has committed. According to the Bank of England, to date 
there has not been evidence of an effect on investment or employment from the 
political uncertainty on the UK’s place in Europe. In our view, it is possible that 
this uncertainty will have a negative impact in the run-up to the referendum.  
 
 
                                                          
10
  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan (2015). “Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms”, 
Working Papers 201508, School of Economics, University College Dublin. 
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Several authors11 have attempted to quantify the impact of a ‘Brexit’ decision. 
Ottaviano et al. (2014) estimate cumulative future losses in UK GDP to be 2.2 per 
cent in an optimistic scenario and between 6.3 and 9.5 per cent in a pessimistic 
one; losses of similar magnitude to the financial crisis. They also argue that these 
estimates are a lower bound on the size of the effect, due to their analysis 
ignoring benefits from factors such as productivity and immigration. Open Europe 
(2015) finds that the impact of Brexit on Ireland is a permanent 1.1 per cent loss 
of GDP by 2030 in the best case, and 3.1 per cent loss in the worst case. 
Bertelsmann (2015) finds losses by 2030 of 0.63 per cent and 2.98 per cent for 
the UK and 0.82 per cent and 2.66 per cent for Ireland in the best and worst 
cases, respectively. 
 
Inflation in the United Kingdom was -0.1 per cent in the year to April 2015, which 
was the first time the Consumer Price Index fell on an annual basis since 
collection of records began in 1960. Core inflation was 0.8 per cent in April. 
Energy prices continued to provide the largest source of downward pressure on 
inflation in the UK, with the Bank of England estimating that three quarters of the 
fall in inflation can be attributed to this source and other external factors. Later 
this year, however, the lower energy prices will be factored into year-on-year 
inflation rates and thus it is likely that inflation will begin to rise again. The Bank 
of England has kept the Bank Rate at 0.5 per cent. Market expectations have 
interest rates beginning to rise in early 2016 and reaching 1.4 per cent after three 
years. 
 
Real GDP in the United Kingdom grew by 0.3 per cent quarter-on-quarter in the 
first quarter of 2015. This was a decrease from the 0.6 per cent growth in the last 
quarter of 2014. In 2014, the UK ran a Current Account deficit of 5.5 per cent of 
GDP. This was the largest deficit (as a percentage of GDP) on the Current Account 
of the Balance of Payments in the G7 bloc. As a result, it is also unlikely that 
further borrowing can support UK economic growth. 
 
The World Economy 
Oil prices have risen slightly since the Spring Commentary. North Sea Brent crude 
oil had an average price per barrel of US$60 in April. This was the highest monthly 
                                                          
11
  Ottaviano, G., J.P. Pessoa, T. Sampson and J. Van Reenan (2014). “The costs and benefits of leaving the EU”, CFS 
Working Paper Series, No. 272. 
Booth, S., C. Howarth, M. Persson, R. Ruparel and P. Swidlicki (2015). “What if...? The consequences, challenges and 
opportunities facing Britain outside EU”, Open Europe Report 03/2015. 
Schoof, U., T. Petersen, R. Aichele, and G. Felbermayer (2015). “Brexit – potential economic consequences if the UK 
exits the EU”, Bertelsmann Stiftung Policy Brief. 
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average in 2015 to date, being a US$4 increase from the average price in March. 
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) highlighted greater global oil 
demand and weakening US supply, despite the significant oil inventories which 
have accumulated. The EIA has current oil price forecasts of US$61 per barrel in 
2015 and US$70 in 2016. As discussed above, these moderate increases in oil 
prices, combined with an energy price base effect, will mean that worldwide 
inflation rates will no longer be lowered to the same degree by energy prices. 
 
Divergent monetary policies, and expectations of further divergences, are 
noticeable in recent exchange rate movements. In relation to countries such as 
the United States, markets expect interest rates to rise relatively soon. By 
contrast, countries such as China, India and Russia have recently cut interest 
rates, while the ECB recently made policy more accommodative through its QE 
programme. According to the UK’s National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (NIESR), there is now only limited scope for further accommodation 
from monetary policy in advanced economies, although oil prices will remain 
supportive to growth. NIESR recently cut its global economic growth forecast for 
2015 from 3.4 per cent to 3.2 per cent. It did, however, revise upward its forecast 
of 2016 growth from 3.6 per cent to 3.8 per cent. 
 
Implications for Irish Exports, Imports and the Balance of Payments 
Based on these international trends, our forecasts for growth in Irish 
merchandise and services exports in 2015 and 2016 remain unchanged from the 
Spring Commentary. This is based on the assumption that the Euro remains at its 
weakened level with respect to both the US Dollar and British Pound. 12 
 
CSO figures for March show seasonally-adjusted exports (merchandise) increased 
by 21 per cent on an annual basis. The main component of Irish exports continues 
to be Medical and pharmaceutical products, which grew by 58 per cent in the 
year to March 2015. Imports grew by 14 per cent year-on-year in March, with 
Medical and pharmaceutical products also being the largest contributor to the 
growth; increasing by 53 per cent. In the first quarter of 2015 exports increased 
by 17 per cent and imports by 10 per cent compared with Q1 2014. 
 
Export developments in 2014 were dominated by the impact of foreign 
processing of Irish-owned goods for export, or what is commonly known as 
‘contract manufacturing’. We forecast that any growth associated with this 
                                                          
12
  We assume that the Euro/Dollar exchange rate will be approximately 1.10 in 2015 and 2016, while the Euro/Sterling 
exchange rate will be approximately 0.72 in both years. 
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phenomenon will continue to dissipate in 2015 and 2016. Similarly, forecasts for 
imports remain strong with merchandise imports expected to grow by 7.2 and 7.4 
per cent in 2015 and 2016 respectively, while growth in services imports is 
expected to be around 2.7 per cent in both 2015 and 2016. Our forecasts for the 
Balance of Payments remain broadly unchanged from the Spring Commentary. 
 
As discussed further in the Appendix, we are able to use the Nowcasting model to 
gain a better understanding of the contract manufacturing issue. We analyse the 
implications for GDP growth when the Industrial Production series most likely to 
be affected by contract manufacturing (Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals) is 
omitted from the analysis. For Q2 2015, this exercise suggests that removing 
these series results in an estimate of quarterly GDP growth which is 0.6 
percentage points lower than if it were included. 
 
FIGURE 2 Proportion of Merchandise Exports and Imports (from and to Ireland) by Geographical Detail  
(Q4 2014, € million) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 present Ireland’s merchandise and service exports and imports by 
destination. The US and the UK continue to be Ireland’s largest bilateral trading 
partners for merchandise. While 56 per cent of Irish exports went to the 
European Union in March, 13 per cent of exports went to the UK with 23 per cent 
going to the US. In terms of merchandise imports, the UK accounted for the 
largest share with the US (13 per cent) and China (7 per cent) being the main non-
EU sources of imports. As far as services are concerned, the most recent data 
suggest a trade surplus with European countries.  
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FIGURE 3 Services Exports and Imports by Geographical Detail (Q4 2014, € million)
13
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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  Data for services exports and imports are only available for EMU18, EU28 and All Countries. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
Output 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply-side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances. 
 
We continue to believe that the Irish economy is set to grow by approximately 4 
per cent in 2015 with a likely increase of 3.5 per cent in 2016. These growth rates, 
along with the actual estimate for 2014, are compared with similar rates across 
Europe in Figure 4.14 The relatively strong Irish performance is apparent even 
compared with the Spanish and the UK economies which have experienced much 
better rates of growth than other countries. One possible reason why the Irish 
and Spanish performance is so impressive is that these economies, along with 
those of Portugal and Greece, suffered the most due to the financial crisis of 
2007/2008. Therefore, in many respects the present growth rates may represent 
these countries ‘catching up’ with their long-run steady state paths. The relatively 
poor growth performance of the key European economies of Germany, France 
and Italy, discussed in some length in the Spring Commentary, is also apparent 
from Figure 4. 
 
                                                          
14
  The forecasts for 2015 and 2016 for all countries except Ireland are the most recent from the EU Commission, while 
the Irish forecasts are from this Commentary. 
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FIGURE 4 Select European Growth Rate Estimates for 2014 and Forecasts for 2015 and 2016 (%) 
 
 
Source:  EU Commission and QEC forecasts. 
 
The present Commentary also devotes significant attention to ongoing statistical 
issues concerning Irish macroeconomic data. In the nowcasting appendix, we 
describe how the approach is used to quantify the implications for GDP growth of 
contract manufacturing. This issue evoked considerable interest in the latter half 
of 2014 when there was some suggestion that much of the significant increase in 
GDP growth rates estimated at that time may have been due to this 
phenomenon. However, while the issue is generally regarded as a significant 
factor in terms of its impact on Irish exports at present, it is somewhat difficult to 
quantify. In assessing its potential impact with the nowcasting approach, the 
model is estimated both with and without the Industrial Production series, which 
is the series most affected by contract manufacturing (Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals). For Q2 2015, this exercise suggests that the absence of this 
series results in GDP growth being 0.6 per cent lower than would otherwise be 
the case. 
 
In the Special Article by FitzGerald, five significant issues which occur when 
interpreting the Irish National Accounts are discussed. These are (i) the patent 
cliff issue concerning the patents on major drugs in Ireland running out; (ii) the 
changing behaviour of the IT sector as to where they accrue profits; (iii) the 
effects of the so-called redomiciled plcs on both GNP and the current account; 
(iv) contract manufacturing and; (v) the potential effects of incorporating aircraft 
leasing firms into the Irish National Accounts. In offering solutions to some of 
these issues, the paper makes the distinction between issues which are germane 
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across countries, as opposed to those that are particular to the Irish 
circumstance. For example, in the case of the redomiciled plcs, the solution is to 
provide more information on a standardised basis. However, in the case of the 
patent cliff and contract manufacturing, there is a clear case for focussing on the 
current account Balance of Payments as opposed to the individual data on 
exports and imports. Equally, it is important to complement the internationally 
accepted concept of GDP with GNP and/or Gross National Income (GNI) in an Irish 
context. 
 
The Research Note by Conroy provides an updated assessment of the volatility of 
Irish quarterly macroeconomic data from 1997 to 2014. The relatively large 
degree of volatility exhibited by the Irish National Accounts is another issue which 
has had implications for timely and accurate assessment of domestic economic 
performance. The Note establishes that while both GNP and GDP are quite 
volatile, the difference between the two is also extremely volatile, highlighting 
the impact that multinational corporations have on national accounting 
aggregates. Finally, the Note points out that, while the new estimates are 
comparable to those found in earlier studies of this issue, the contemporary 
sources of volatility are not just confined to manufacturing, which was previously 
established as the main source. Volatility is also apparent in the distribution, 
transport, software and communication sectors of the Irish economy. 
 
Monetary and Financial Conditions 
The first half of 2015 has seen renewed attention being devoted to the setting of 
variable interest rates in the Irish mortgage market. Recent research from the 
Central Bank of Ireland shows that a household with an SVR mortgage on a 
€200,000 loan is paying on average 4.2 per cent. This compares with an average 
rate of 2.09 per cent in the rest of the Euro Area, where variable rate mortgages 
are not as popular as they are in Ireland. In recent weeks AIB (and its EBS and 
Haven brands) have declared that they will be reducing their SVR for both new 
and existing customers if the bank's cost of funds, operating costs and 
assessment of risk continue to decline. This follows a reduction in their SVR by 
0.25 per cent at the end of 2014. 
 
In a follow-up to work done by Goggin et al. (2012),15 the Note by McQuinn and 
Morley (2015) re-examines the ‘pass-through’ relationship between the ECB 
policy rate and the SVR charged by Irish credit institutions. Based on the analysis, 
which includes data on the main banks in the Irish market up to the end of 2014, 
                                                          
15
  Goggin J., S. Holton, J. Kelly, R. Lydon and K. McQuinn (2012). “The financial crisis and the pricing of interest rates in 
the Irish mortgage market: 2003-2011”, Central Bank of Ireland Research Technical Paper 1/RT/12. 
16 | Quarterly Economic Commentary – Summer 2015 
 
the relationship between the ECB policy rate and the SVR appears to have further 
weakened. A significant and increasing wedge now persists between these two 
rates.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that the most effective way for the continuing 
wedge between the different mortgage variable interest rates to be remedied is 
for greater competition within the domestic banking sector. The necessity for 
greater competition is important as it has implications for any policy intervention 
in this area. Central to this issue also is the need for a more efficient resolution of 
the mortgage arrears problem and, in general, for Irish financial institutions to 
repair more aggressively the impaired aspects of their balance sheets. 
 
While the mortgage market is the most obvious case of where the banking sector 
is still suffering from the effects of the financial crash, there would also appear to 
be evidence of a breakdown in typical pass-through relationships in other sectors 
of the Irish economy. For example, if we look at retail interest rates charged to 
Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs) for loans below and in excess of €1 million it is 
evident that a significant ‘wedge’ has arisen post-2007 in the rates charged for 
the different sized loans. 
 
Figure 5 plots the retail rates charged by Irish financial institutions to NFCs for 
loans both less than and greater than €1 million for loans that are up to one year 
fixed. From early 2009, a noticeable difference emerges between the two rates 
charged. This wedge has remained constant ever since and if anything has shown 
signs of widening in recent times.  
 
FIGURE 5 Retail Interest Rates (Floating) Charged to Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs) for Loans up to  
€1 million and for Loans in Excess of €1 million: Q1 2005 – Q1 2015 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
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Ongoing issues on the balance sheets of financial institutions may have 
implications for the strength of the economic recovery currently underway. For 
example, the overall credit outlook for the Irish economy remains subdued. In 
Table 1 we present the year-on-year growth rates in credit extension for the main 
sectors in the economy according to their outstanding credit levels over the past 
six years.16 As can be seen, nearly all the major sectors of the Irish economy have 
registered negative growth rates in credit extension since 2009. This raises 
significant questions as to the extent to which the financial sector is actively 
contributing to growth in the economy at this point. 
 
TABLE 1 Annual Growth Rates in Sectoral Credit Levels (%) 
 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 Dec-14 
Real Estate 0.1 -0.7 0.5 -4.1 -5.9 -10.5 
Wholesale/Retail       
 Trade and Repairs  -1.8 -3.9 -3.4 -8.2 -3.3 -0.1 
Hotels and Restaurants 4.5 -4.7 -2.0 -2.3 -11.1 -4.2 
Manufacturing -12.0 -11.4 -1.3 -6.0 -0.6 0.9 
Primary Industries -2.3 3.9 -4.1 -2.0 -2.1 -4.8 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Financing conditions for the Irish sovereign remained very favourable in the first 
quarter of the year. The National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) 
undertook three bond issuances in recent months, raising a total of €8.5 billion at 
very low yields. This represents more than half of their total funding target set for 
the year. The first quarter of the year also saw the NTMA make a third early 
repayment of Ireland’s IMF loan facility. As a result it has now repaid just over 
€18 billion, or 81 per cent, of Ireland’s total IMF borrowings, covering all 
payments due up to January 2021. The NTMA has already raised €9.5 billion this 
year out of a total targeted fund-raising of €12 billion to €15 billion. Most of the 
money raised to date has been for longer maturities, including €4.5 billion raised 
in a new 30-year bond. 
 
Euro Area bond yields are continuing on a downward trend mainly due to the 
ECB’s QE programme (see Figure 6 for select cross-country yields). In March the 
NTMA sold €500 million of six-month Treasury Bills. Total bids for the auction 
amounted to €1.965 billion, almost four times the amount on offer. This auction 
signified the first time ever that the agency sold debt at a negative yield, -0.01 per 
cent.  
                                                          
16
  We have excluded the financial intermediation category. 
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FIGURE 6 10-year Sovereign Bond Yield (per cent) 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
Prices and Earnings 
The annual rate of inflation was negative for the fifth month in a row in April. 
Data from the CSO show that prices on average, as measured by the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), were 0.7 per cent lower in April 2015 compared with 12 months 
previous. Transport costs were the main drivers in lowering the index, falling 6 
per cent over the year as petrol and diesel costs fell. Similarly, prices on average, 
as measured by the EU Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), decreased 
by 0.4 per cent compared with April 2014.  
 
Consumer prices in April, as measured by the CPI, remained unchanged in the 
month whereas prices rose by 0.1 per cent in the month of April of last year. 
While the CPI has been negative for five successive months, much of the fall has 
been influenced by global trends in oil prices and interest rates.  
 
Our forecasts for inflation are broadly in line with those presented in the Spring 
Commentary. The modest increases reported in 2015 and 2016 reflect both the 
combination of increased domestic economic activity and increases in Euro Area 
inflation rates due, partially, to the QE measures announced at the beginning of 
the year. 
 
  
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
3.00 
3.50 
4.00 
Euro area  Germany Ireland UK 
April 2013  
April 2014 
April 2015 
Quarterly Economic Commentary – Summer 2015 | 19 
 
TABLE 2 Inflation Measures 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 Annual Change 
 % % % % 
CPI 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.0 
Personal Consumption Deflator 1.9 1.6 2.0 2.0 
HICP 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.2 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
 
Average Hourly Earnings increased from €22.14 per hour in Q1 2014 to €22.23 in 
Q1 2015, representing an increase of 0.4 per cent. This compares with a revised 
increase of 1.4 per cent in Average Hourly Earnings in the year to Q4 2014 from 
€21.73 to €22.04 per hour. Seasonally adjusted, they increased by 1.1 per cent in 
the quarter to Q1 2015, rising from €21.83 to €22.07.  
 
Average Hourly Earnings increased in seven of the 13 main sectors in the year to 
Q1 2015. The largest increase (5.9 per cent) was recorded in the Information and 
Communications sector. The Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 
sector saw the largest annual fall in Average Hourly Earnings to Q1 2015, 
decreasing 2.6 per cent from €25.34 to €24.68 per hour.  
 
Across the sectors hourly earnings have increased in nine of the 13 sectors, the 
largest percentage increase was recorded in the information and communication 
sector rising from €26.93 to €30.51. The largest percentage decrease in Average 
Hourly Earnings over the same period was recorded in the Human health and 
social work sector which was down 6.3 per cent. 
 
Private sector Average Hourly Earnings increased 0.6 per cent in the year to Q1 
2015, while public sector hourly earnings fell by 0.4 per cent in the same period. 
The estimated number of persons employed in the public sector also showed a 
reduction of 0.2 per cent over the year to Q1 2015.  
 
In the year to Q1 2015 the largest percentage employment decrease was 
recorded in the Regional Bodies sector which was down 3.3 per cent from Q1 
2014. The largest percentage increase over the same period was recorded in the 
Health sector, increasing 0.8 per cent from 118,700 to 119,600 people employed. 
Over the four years from Q1 2011 to Q1 2015 overall employment numbers in the 
public sector fell by 8.5 per cent from 409,400 to 374,600.  
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We forecast growth in average earnings of 1 per cent in 2015 and 2016. While 
these increases may appear somewhat modest, it is worth noting that 
unemployment, while falling in 2015 and 2016, will still be above its long-run 
median rate by the end of 2016. Thus, the continued presence of over-capacity in 
the Irish labour market is likely to temper modest wage and pay increases. In 
some respects, this is similar to developments in the US and UK labour markets at 
present; falling unemployment rates have not resulted in a significant increase in 
wage rates. We also forecast that current transfers (social welfare payments) will 
continue to decline in line with the rise in employment. Based on the increase in 
employment we also forecast a continuing increase in personal disposable 
income. 
 
Demand 
Household Sector Consumption  
The continuing improvement in the Irish labour market is one of the main factors 
underpinning our forecast growth in personal consumption. The preliminary 
National Accounts for 2014 show an annual increase of 1.1 per cent in volume 
and 2.7 per cent in value last year, implying a consumption deflator of 1.6 per 
cent. Retail sales data for the early months of 2015 indicate that the volume of 
retail sales has grown strongly, although the growth rate is more moderate when 
car sales are excluded.  
 
In addition to the labour market, other indicators also suggest that personal 
consumption growth will increase in 2015. The three-month moving average for 
the KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index continues to increase, suggesting 
that consumer confidence continues to improve. At an aggregate level, higher 
employment numbers are reflected in personal income growth. With interest 
rates likely to remain low we have assumed that the personal savings ratio will 
remain broadly unchanged.  
 
In the Research Note by Duffy, Morley and Watson, the KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer 
Sentiment Index, which has been compiled since February 1996, is discussed in 
some detail. The underlying questions in the index enable consumers’ 
perceptions as to their current and future financial situation to be captured. A 
Consumer Sentiment Index is now also provided for Dublin. The index shows that, 
following the crash in the Irish economy, consumer sentiment started to improve 
in the first half of 2012, with much of this being driven by a more positive 
perception of the labour market. Recent work by D’Agostino and Mendicino 
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(2015)17 illustrates how this kind of sentiment information can be useful in 
models forecasting future consumption levels.  
 
In terms of loans for house purchase, households continued to deleverage during 
the first quarter of 2015 with repayments exceeding drawdowns by €2.2 billion 
over the 12 months to the end of March 2015. Repayments of household loans 
also exceeded drawdowns by €26 million in March 2015. In addition, loans 
outstanding to Irish households decreased by 3.2 per cent year-on-year in March 
2015. Loans for house purchase, which accounted for 82 per cent of total 
household loans, declined at an annual rate of 2.7 per cent while outstanding 
lending for consumption and other purposes declined by 5 per cent year-on-year.  
 
The Central Bank’s Quarterly Financial Accounts for Q4 2014 indicate that 
household wealth rose to €600.8 billion during the final quarter of 2014 which 
represents an increase of 4.3 per cent over the period. This rise in net worth 
largely reflects increases in housing assets and declining household liabilities. 
While still extremely high by international standards, household debt 
sustainability continued to improve in the final quarter of 2014. Debt as a 
proportion of disposable income declined by 3.7 per cent and now stands at 
168.7 per cent, its lowest level since Q4 2005. This figure should continue to 
improve as disposable income increases and further reductions in debt occur. 
 
While many factors point to increases in consumption levels, we moderate our 
outlook given the high level of debt still held by Irish households and the 
deleveraging associated with this. Therefore, while we forecast growth in 
consumption for both 2015 and 2016, the increase is not as large as it would be in 
the absence of such elevated debt levels.18  
 
Property Market Developments 
While residential property prices fell month-on-month for the first two months of 
2015, prices increased in March and are up a further 0.6 per cent in April. As a 
result, residential property prices nationally are up 15.8 per cent on an annual 
basis.  
 
                                                          
17
  D’Agostino A. and C. Mendicino (2015). “The information content of confidence surveys for Euro Area consumption 
dynamics”, Paper presented to the Irish Economics Association conference, Dublin. 
18
  Using microeconomic data, McCarthy and McQuinn (2015) demonstrate the negative relationship between 
deleveraging and consumption for Irish households. McCarthy Y. and K. McQuinn (2015) “Deleveraging in a highly 
indebted property market: Who does it and are there implications for household consumption?”, Review of Income 
and Wealth, forthcoming. 
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Prices in Dublin also rose in April by 1 per cent with residential property prices 
now 20.2 per cent higher than in April 2014. Outside of Dublin, prices increased 
marginally in the month to April by 0.3 per cent resulting in annual growth of 11.4 
per cent. 
 
Dublin residential property prices overall are 38.1 per cent lower than their 
highest level during the peak with house prices in particular still 37.8 per cent 
below peak levels. Outside of Dublin, residential property prices are 41.4 per cent 
lower while, at a national level, residential prices are 37.8 per cent lower than 
their peak level in 2007.  
 
Given the volatility in residential house prices in the first three months of the 
year, it is still unclear how macro-prudential rules implemented by the Central 
Bank at the beginning of this year will affect price growth and supply. Both Duffy 
et al. (2015)19 and Gerlach-Kristen and McInerney (2014)20 show that these 
measures are likely to have a contractionary impact on house prices. This effect is 
found to be persistent for the lifetime of the policy. It is anticipated that house 
prices will continue to rise in the coming months as consumers who were granted 
mortgage approval in advance of the implementation of the rules move to avail 
of them. Price increases are then expected to slow as the new rules come into 
effect. 
 
We have updated our estimates of the number of mortgages in negative equity21 
to take account of house price data to end-2014. This suggests that there has 
been a further fall in the number of mortgages in negative equity. Having peaked 
at close to 315,000 at the end of 2012, the growth in house prices in 2013 
reduced this to 267,000. It is now estimated that, nationally, just over 161,000 
were in negative equity at the end of 2014. On the assumption that national 
house prices grow by about 9 per cent in 2015 then the number in negative 
equity could fall to below 100,000 by the end of the year. Research has found 
that households in negative equity may consume less as they feel less wealthy 
but also feel that they no longer have access to funds through housing equity 
(Disney et al. 2010).22 In an Irish context, Gerlach-Kristen (2013)23 found a 
negative impact on consumption, particularly for younger households. McCarthy 
                                                          
19
  Duffy D., N. McInerney and K. McQuinn (2015). “Macro-Prudential Policy in a Recovering Housing Market: Too Much 
Too Soon?” ESRI Working Paper No. 500, 2015. 
20
  Gerlach-Kristen, P. and N. McInerney (2014). “The Role of Credit in the Housing Market”, ESRI Working Paper No. 495. 
21
  See Duffy, D. (2014). “Updated Estimates on the Extent of Negative Equity in the Irish Housing Market”, Research 
Note, 2014/2/1, ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary.  
22
  Disney, R., J. Gathergood and A. Henley (2010). “House Price Shocks, Negative Equity and Household Consumption in 
the United Kingdom”, Journal of European Economic Association,  Vol. 8(6), December. 
23
  Gerlach-Kristen, P., (2013). “Younger and Older Households in the Crisis”, Research Note 2013/1/4, ESRI Quarterly 
Economic Commentary.  
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and McQuinn (2013)24 found that improvements in housing wealth did not 
translate into higher household consumption if the household is in negative 
equity. 
 
FIGURE 7 Numbers in Negative Equity, end-year 
 
Source:  Own estimates based on Central Statistics Office data. 
 
The PRTB/ESRI Rent Index shows that rental growth remains strong. Results for 
the last quarter of 2014 show, on an annual basis, national rents were 5.8 per 
cent higher than in Quarter 4 of 2013. Annual growth in the Dublin market was 
stronger, up by 9.6 per cent. In contrast, annual growth in rents for the market 
outside Dublin was more subdued, recording growth of 3.9 per cent when 
compared to the fourth quarter of 2013. The index shows that, nationally, rents 
peaked in the fourth quarter of 2007 before declining by 26 per cent to their 
trough in the first quarter of 2012. By Quarter 4, 2014 rents nationally were 17.8 
per cent lower than their peak. The Daft.ie Asking Price Index suggests that the 
growth has continued in the first quarter of 2015.  
 
Taking account of all these factors we forecast that the volume of personal 
consumption will grow by 2 per cent in 2015 and by 2.4 per cent in 2016. With 
the deflator on personal consumption expected to increase marginally to an 
average of 2 per cent in both years the value of personal consumption is 
expected to grow by 4 per cent this year and by 4.4 per cent in 2016.  
                                                          
24
  McCarthy, Y., and K. McQuinn (2013). “Price expectations, distressed mortgage markets and the housing wealth 
effect”, Central Bank of Ireland Research Technical Paper 6/RT/13, August. 
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Supply 
Investment 
National Accounts data for the fourth quarter of 2014 suggest that the carry-over 
from the volume of investment into 2015 was 14.3 per cent. Thus, we have 
maintained our view that investment growth will underpin much of the activity in 
the domestic economy in 2015 and 2016.  
 
FIGURE 8 Housing Market Indicators 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and the Department of Environment. 
 
Despite this, based on data for Q1 2015, we have revised down our forecast for 
housing completions. In addition, as highlighted in the recent SCSI report25 
completions data are based on connections to the electricity network and so may 
not reflect building activity. The report suggests that the gap between 
completions and activity may currently be approximately 20 per cent. However, 
as the overhang of vacant stock is absorbed, it is expected that completions will 
again start to provide a more accurate guide to housebuilding. On the basis of the 
above we have revised our forecast for completions to 13,000 and 15,000 units in 
2015 and 2016 respectively. 
 
                                                          
25
  Society of Chartered Surveyors Ireland (2015). “Irish Construction Prospects to 2016”. 
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While it may still be too early to attribute any particular reason for this lower 
than expected supply, Duffy et al. (2015)26, in a detailed assessment of the recent 
macro-prudential measures implemented by the Central Bank of Ireland, argue 
that these measures are likely to be contractionary in nature with fewer houses 
being supplied to the domestic market than would otherwise be the case. 
 
New build and refurbishment means we expect the commercial property sector 
to also show strong growth. This is particularly the case with office space, where 
the vacancy rate continues to decline. Total building and construction is expected 
to grow by 14.4 per cent in volume in 2015. Given the higher bases, the rate of 
volume increase is forecast to be slightly lower in 2016 at about 13 per cent but 
the absolute rise is forecast to be of the same order of magnitude at about €1.8 
billion.  
 
Our expectation that the economy will continue to expand means that we 
anticipate investment growth in machinery and equipment. In addition, low 
interest rates should provide a positive backdrop to all forms of physical 
investment. Volume growth in machinery and equipment investment is forecast 
to be about 11 per cent in 2015 and approximately 6.6 per cent in 2016. On the 
basis of these forecasts, total investment volume growth of 12.5 per cent in 2015 
and 9.2 per cent in 2016 is forecast. Taking account of the investment deflator, 
the value of investment activity is expected to grow by 15.3 per cent and by 12.2 
per cent in 2015 and 2016 respectively.  
 
Labour Market 
The most recent Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) for the first quarter 
of 2015 indicates a 2.2 per cent increase in employment in the year to Q1 2015. 
This compares with an annual increase in employment of 1.5 per cent in the final 
quarter of 2014. On a seasonally-adjusted basis, total employment increased by 
0.6 per cent over the previous quarter.  
 
The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate decreased from 10.4 per cent to 9.9 
per cent over the first quarter of 2015. This is the eleventh quarter in succession 
where unemployment has declined on an annual basis and is now at its lowest 
rate since January 2009. The increase consisted of an increase in full-time 
employment of 3.6 per cent as well as a decrease in part-time employment of 2.4 
per cent. The improvement in labour market conditions remains one of the most 
                                                          
26
  Duffy, D., N. McInerney and K. McQuinn (2015). “Macro-Prudential Policy in a Recovering Property Market: Too Much 
Too Soon?” ESRI Working Paper No. 500, 2015. 
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reliable indicators of recovering economic activity and is further reflected in the 
strong PRSI returns over the past number of months. 
 
The QNHS also highlights that employment increased in ten of the 14 economic 
sectors over the year (excluding Not Stated) and fell in four. The largest rate of 
increase was recorded in the Construction sector, which was up 19.1 per cent, or 
19,600 people, from a very low base.  
 
In the Spring Commentary we highlighted the issue of Irish participation rates 
failing to rise as quickly as anticipated given the sharp fall in unemployment. It 
appears that this issue remains unresolved with a further decline in the overall 
participation rate of 0.3 per cent in the year to Q1 2015. We continue to believe 
that this phenomenon may be influenced by changes within the 15-19 year old 
age group. In Q3 2007, for example, the participation rate within this age group 
was 33.4 per cent. By Q4 2014 this rate had fallen to 15.3 per cent and has now 
declined further to 12.6 in Q1 2015. It may be the case that many within this age 
group returned to education in the aftermath of the financial crisis and continue 
to remain in education even with improving labour market conditions. However, 
with relatively little research in this area it is difficult to determine the exact 
reasons for this phenomenon. 
 
Therefore, we forecast only a marginal increase in the participation rate in both 
2015 and 2016. We also forecast that the annual average unemployment rate will 
be 9.6 per cent in 2015 and 8.3 per cent in 2016. Employment growth will 
continue in both industry and services with strong employment growth in 
Construction forecast to continue into 2016. 
 
Public Finances 
Following the positive trend set in 2014, tax receipts for the first four months of 
2015 were over half a billion euro ahead of target. While €43 million lower than 
government forecasts, VAT receipts were still up 10.3 per cent when compared to 
the same period last year. The continuing strength of the labour market is very 
much apparent with PRSI receipts €24 million ahead of target in April and €147 
million year-to-date. Ongoing growth in employment as well as increases in 
personal incomes, improving consumer sentiment and corporate profits should 
underpin growth in tax revenue throughout 2015 and 2016. 
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On the basis of a fiscally neutral budget27 in 2015, we predict that the deficit will 
decline to 2.3 per cent of GDP, with a further reduction to 1.2 per cent in 2016. 
This represents a significant improvement in the public finances, particularly 
when compared with the sizeable deficits of 11.3 and 10.7 per cent incurred in 
2010 and 2011 respectively. We highlighted in the Spring Commentary that, if the 
economy continues to grow significantly in 2016, budgetary policy will play an 
important role in moderating economic activity. This may require that budgetary 
policy actually starts targeting fiscal surpluses as early as 2017.  
 
Based on these projections gross debt as a proportion of GDP should continue to 
fall steadily. By the end of 2016 we forecast that gross debt will fall below 100 per 
cent following the peak of 123 per cent of GDP incurred in 2013. 
 
TABLE 3 Public Finances 
 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 
 €bn €bn % change €bn % change 
Income      
Taxes on income incl. Social insurance 32.9 34.2 3.7 35.6 4.2 
Taxes on expenditure 20.8 22.2 6.7 23.4 5.3 
Gross trading and investment income 3.7 3.6 -1.5 3.0 -17.7 
Other Income 3.1 3.2 1.9 3.2 0.0 
Total receipts: Current 60.6 63.2 4.3 65.1 3.1 
Total receipts: Capital 0.6 0.7 21.9 0.7 -2.8 
Total receipts: Current and Capital 61.2 63.9 4.5 65.8 3.0 
Expenditure      
Subsidies 1.7 2.1 18.5 2.1 0.5 
National debt interest 7.5 6.9 -8.6 6.6 -3.8 
Transfer payments 28.5 27.4 -3.9 27.0 -1.5 
Expenditure on Goods and Services 27.3 28.8 5.6 29.3 1.7 
Total expenditure: Current 65.0 65.1 0.2 65.0 -0.2 
Total expenditure: Capital 3.7 3.4 -7.0 3.5 1.5 
Total expenditure: Current and Capital  68.7 68.6 -0.2 68.5 -0.1 
General Govt. Balance -7.6 -4.7  -2.6  
As % of GDP -4.1 -2.3  -1.2  
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
  
                                                          
27
  Fiscal neutrality means that demand in the economy is neither stimulated nor diminished by taxation and 
Government spending. 
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General Assessment 
 
As we come to the end of the second quarter of 2015, the prevailing trends in 
most of the recent Irish economic data suggest that the economy is on course to 
register growth of about 4 per cent for the present year. The strong growth 
observed in taxation receipts in 2014 has continued into the present year with 
the increases in PRSI confirming the ongoing recovery in the labour market; 
employment grew by 2.2 per cent year-on-year to Q1 2015, and the 
unemployment rate at 9.9 per cent is now at its lowest since January 2009. Our 
latest nowcasting estimate indicates that the Irish economy grew by 
approximately 1 per cent between Q1 2015 and Q2 2015 and between Q4 2014 
and Q1 2015. 
 
Trends in international markets are somewhat mixed as far as the Irish economy 
is concerned; both the US and UK economies have experienced weaker than 
expected outturns for Q1 2015, however, the Eurozone has experienced some 
modest increase in activity albeit in comparison with an initial, very low outlook 
envisaged at the start of the year. Given the relatively poor start to the year for 
some of our key export markets, these trends will be keenly followed as the year 
progresses. 
 
In terms of domestic sources of growth, the most recent consumer sentiment 
data indicate that expectations concerning general economic conditions are 
continuing to improve in 2015. While growth in investment is still set to 
contribute strongly this year, the most recent available data for housing 
completions suggest that supply levels in 2015 are likely to fall below our initial 
forecast. This may reflect the results in Duffy et al. (2015), which predicted that 
the adoption of the macro-prudential measures by the Central Bank of Ireland 
would have a contractionary impact on activity in the residential construction 
sector.  
 
Given the strong increases in residential house prices, in this Commentary we also 
revise our estimates of negative equity in the Irish market. The number of 
mortgages in negative equity peaked at 315,000 towards the end of 2012. The 
increase in prices means that this number has fallen to 161,000 by the end of 
2014 and, under plausible price forecasts for 2015, is set to decline further to just 
under 100,000 mortgages by the end of that year. Based on the results of 
Quarterly Economic Commentary – Summer 2015 | 29 
 
research for the Irish mortgage market, this should have a positive effect on 
household consumption levels. 
 
The publication of the Government’s Spring Economic Statement in May brings 
the public finances into focus. The Stability Programme sets out the Governments 
macroeconomic and fiscal projections out to 2020. This welcome development 
brings a degree of transparency to macroeconomic policy and provides an 
important context for policy debate, particularly, given the electoral cycle.  
 
Overall, the macroeconomic forecasts for economic growth out to 2020 are 
credible, although, arguably, somewhat optimistic. The forecasts indicate that the 
rate of potential output growth in the Irish economy is approximately 3.5 per 
cent; results from Byrne and McQuinn (2014)28 would suggest a figure 
somewhere in the region of 2.5 to 3 per cent.  
 
As far as the public finances are concerned, the Stability Programme update 
indicates that the Government intends to run an expansionary budgetary policy 
in 2016 of approximately €1.2 billion comprising a 50:50 split between taxation 
and expenditure measures. This policy choice should be examined in the context 
of where the economy is likely to be next year vis-à-vis its potential level of 
activity. Our conclusion, based on the work in Byrne and McQuinn (2014), is that 
the Irish economy will be at or very near its potential level in 2016. Indeed the 
Stability Programme update, which uses the methodology of the European 
Commission, reports a positive output gap in 2016 of 1 per cent. In such 
circumstances an expansionary budgetary policy is not advisable and does 
suggest that the government is adopting a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. While there 
was little alternative in the aftermath of the financial crisis to a contractionary, 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy, given the state of the public finances, it is regrettable 
now, once we have discretion in terms of the policy choices available, that such a 
course of action has been signalled.29  
 
The forecasts also suggest that the Government intends to commence running 
fiscal surpluses in 2019. However, if the economy grows along the lines suggested 
                                                          
28
  Byrne, D. and K. McQuinn (2014). “Irish Economic Performance 1987-2013: A Growth Accounting Assessment”, 
Research Note, 2014/4/1, ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary. 
29  A number of studies such as Fitzgerald (2013) and Kearney (2013) have examined the impact of fiscal policy on the 
economy in the post financial crisis era.  
Fitzgerald J. (2013). “The Impact of Fiscal Policy on the Economy”, Research Note  2013/3/1, ESRI Quarterly Economic 
Commentary.  
Kearney I. (2013). “Measuring Fiscal Stance”, Special Article, ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn, pp. 67-
88. 
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for 2016, 2017 and 2018, a counter-cyclical policy would likely suggest that fiscal 
surpluses should be targeted in 2018 and even possibly in 2017. 
 
Another policy issue, which has experienced some comment recently, is the 
ongoing differential or ‘wedge’ observed between the SVR charged to many Irish 
mortgage holders and the rates on tracker mortgages. In the Research Note by 
McQuinn and Morley, we update an earlier analysis of this issue (Goggin et al., 
2012). The empirical exercise, which is conducted with bank-level data, identifies 
that the observed breakdown in the relationship between the ECB policy interest 
rate and domestic mortgage variable rates, which was evident by 2011, has 
actually weakened further over the past three years. Following from the results of 
the earlier analysis, the Note identifies a number of factors which are causing this 
wedge: the rate of both mortgage arrears and tracker mortgages on the balance 
sheets of individual institutions and the lack of competition in the domestic retail 
market. The latter result, in particular, should act as a caution in terms of any 
policy intervention considered for this issue. 
 
In the monetary and financial section we identify that differences in other key 
interest rates, which have emerged post the financial crisis in certain sectors of 
the Irish economy, still persist. The continued presence of impaired loans on the 
balance sheets of Irish financial institutions (such as the mortgage arrears issue) 
constitutes an ongoing downside risk to the economic recovery. From an 
economy-wide perspective, it is worth observing that the growth rate of credit 
for the key sectors of the Irish economy, as defined by their total credit levels, has 
been negative for the past six years. This gives further credence to the argument 
that the Irish recovery has, up to this date, been essentially a credit-less 
phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 91.8 16.4 17.2 106.8 8.8 7.0 116.2 7.6 5.2 125.1 
Tourism 3.4 8.7 7.0 3.7 5.5 3.4 3.9 5.5 3.4 4.1 
Other Services 88.9 9.4 8.0 97.3 4.4 3.0 101.6 5.1 3.6 106.8 
Exports Of Goods and Services 184.1 12.9 12.6 207.8 6.7 5.1 221.7 6.4 4.5 235.9 
FISM Adjustment 0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0 
Adjusted Exports 184.1 12.9 12.6 207.8 6.7 5.1 221.7 6.4 4.5 235.9 
 
 
 
Forecast Table A2 Investment 
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 3.2 26.0 15.0 4.1 13.4 13.3 4.6 12.4 8.0 5.2 
Other Building 7.3 6.6 3.6 7.7 21.8 18.3 9.4 19.5 15.8 11.3 
Transfer Costs 0.5 6.0 2.9 0.5 13.3 10.0 0.6 13.3 10.0 0.7 
Building and Construction 11.0 12.3 8.8 12.3 18.6 14.4 14.6 17.0 13.2 17.1 
Machinery and Equipment 15.5 15.4 13.0 17.9 13.7 11.3 20.4 8.8 6.6 22.2 
Total Investment 26.5 14.5 11.3 30.4 15.3 12.5 35.0 12.2 9.2 39.3 
  
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 3.0 2.5 0.1 3.1 2.5 0.1 3.2 2.5 0.1 3.3 
Non-Agricultural Wages 71.9 1.8 1.3 73.1 3.7 2.7 75.8 3.9 2.9 78.8 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 15.2 22.7 3.5 19.0 15.5 2.9 22.0 12.9 2.8 24.8 
Total Income Received 90.1 5.3 4.8 95.2 6.0 5.7 100.9 5.8 5.9 106.8 
Current Transfers 24.5 2.0 0.5 25.0 -5.0 -1.3 23.7 -2.1 -0.5 23.2 
Gross Personal Income 114.6 4.6 5.3 120.2 3.7 4.4 124.7 4.3 5.4 130.0 
Direct Personal Taxes 25.3 8.7 2.2 27.5 3.9 1.1 28.6 2.4 0.7 29.2 
Personal Disposable Income 89.3 3.5 3.1 92.7 3.7 3.4 96.1 4.9 4.7 100.8 
Consumption 83.3 2.7 2.3 85.6 4.0 3.5 89.1 4.4 4.0 93.0 
Personal Savings 5.9 13.6 0.8 7.1 -1.0 -0.1 7.0 10.1 0.7 7.8 
Savings Ratio 6.6 
  
7.7 
  
7.3   7.7 
Average Personal Tax Rate 22.3 
  
22.8 
  
22.8   22.4 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 Imports of Goods and Services  
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 55.6 9.6 8.8 60.9 8.8 7.2 66.3 9.5 7.4 72.6 
Tourism 4.7 0.6 1.2 4.7 4.2 1.2 4.9 4.9 1.8 5.1 
Other Services 87.4 3.2 2.8 102.5 3.1 2.8 105.6 2.9 2.9 108.7 
Imports of Goods and Services 147.7 13.8 0.0 168.1 5.2 0.0 176.8 5.4 0.0 186.5 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0 
  
0.0   0.0 
Adjusted Imports 147.7 13.8 13.2 168.1 5.2 4.4 176.8 5.4 4.6 186.5 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 Balance of Payments 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 184.1 207.8 221.7 235.9 
Imports of Goods and Services 147.7 168.1 176.8 186.5 
Net Factor Payments -27.3 -27.0 -28.9 -30.6 
Net Transfers -2.5 -2.3 -2.4 -2.5 
Balance on Current Account 6.6 10.5 13.6 16.4 
As a % of GNP 4.5 6.6 7.9 9.0 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 107 109 109 109 
Industry 343 348 371 382 
Of which: Construction 102 109 120 125 
Services 1,431 1,453 1,480 1,523 
Total at Work 1,880 1,914 1,961 2,014 
Unemployed 282 243 208 183 
Labour Force 2,163 2,157 2,169 2,197 
Unemployment Rate, % 13.0 11.3 9.6 8.3 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
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Nowcasting Appendix 
 
TABLE 1  Current Backcast and Nowcast of Irish Quarter-on-Quarter GDP Growth Rates 
 
Period 
Nature of 
Estimate 
GDP Estimate % 95% Confidence Interval 
Q1 2015 Backcast 1.09 -0.46 2.64 
Q2 2015 Nowcast 1.00 -0.51 2.52 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
In the Spring Commentary, an Appendix was introduced to the QEC which 
presents results from the nowcasting model now used at the ESRI. Detailed 
discussion of the model can be found in the Spring 2015 Commentary and in a 
recent Research Note.30 
 
In this Appendix, we use the nowcasting model to examine the potential effects 
of ‘contract manufacturing’ on GDP growth rates. This phenomenon, which 
attracted much attention in relation to Irish GDP growth figures in 2014, involves 
the foreign processing of Irish-owned goods for export. The net effect of contract 
manufacturing on the National Accounts appears to be small due to associated 
imports which net off against exports in the accounts. With the release of the 
Quarterly National Accounts for the fourth quarter of 2014, the Central Statistics 
Office31 announced that contract manufacturing was receiving  
undue significance [...] in explaining the improved economic 
results reported for the Irish economy in the quarters of 2014.  
 
Contract manufacturing does, however, affect specific indicators within the 
Industrial Production and trade statistics. Given that these series are used to 
estimate the GDP growth rates in the nowcasting model, we attempt to correct 
for the contract manufacturing issue by omitting the series most likely to be 
affected by this issue. For example, the Industrial Production series most affected 
relate to Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals. In March 2015, for instance, there was 
a 75 per cent annual increase in the volume index of industrial production for 
Chemical and Pharmaceuticals. This contributed to a 41.5 per cent annual 
increase in the headline Industrial Production series. 
                                                          
30
  Byrne, D., K. McQuinn and C. Morley (2014). “Nowcasting and the Need for Timely Estimates of Movements in Irish 
Output”, Research Note, 2014/3/1, ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary. 
31
  Central Statistics Office (2015). “Contract Manufacturing”, CSO Information Notice. 
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Therefore, we estimate the nowcasting model both with and without the 
Industrial Production series most affected by contract manufacturing. We 
quantify the effects of contract manufacturing by then comparing the two 
different estimates of quarterly GDP growth rates. Omitting the Industrial 
Production series, we estimate quarter-on-quarter growth rates of approximately 
1 per cent in both the first quarter and second quarter of 2015. Using the 
‘unadjusted’ model which includes the Industrial Production series, we estimate a 
growth rate of 1.6 per cent for the second quarter of 2015. Thus, based on the 
nowcasting model, the contract manufacturing issue, contributes, at most, over 
half a per cent to GDP growth at this point. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special Article 
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Problems Interpreting National Accounts in a 
Globalised Economy - Ireland 
John FitzGerald32 
1. Introduction 
The globalisation of the world economy encompasses a number of different 
related processes which have resulted in a steady increase in the share of trade in 
national output or national income. Over time, this process results in a change in 
the structure of individual economies. While traditional national accounting rules 
can accommodate many of these changes, some of the more recent 
developments pose challenges both for national accounting practices and, more 
important, for the interpretation of the national accounts themselves. Because of 
the very open nature of the Irish economy this is a particular problem in 
interpreting the national accounts data for Ireland. 
 
This article focuses on five special problems in interpreting the Irish national 
accounts. These are: 
1.  The so called “patent cliff”. Because the pharmaceutical sector accounts for a 
substantial share of Gross Value Added (GVA), developments in the statistical 
treatment of the sector can have a significant impact on the national 
accounts: for example, if patents on major drugs produced in Ireland run out. 
2.  The changing behaviour of the IT sector as to where they accrue their profits. 
3.  The effects of so called “redomiciled plcs” on Gross National Income (GNI) / 
Gross National Product (GNP) and on the current account. 
4.  The inclusion in exports and imports of goods and services produced abroad 
for Irish companies and later sold abroad. 
5.  The potential effects of incorporating aircraft leasing firms fully into the Irish 
national accounts. 
 
Together these problems have a very big impact on the national accounts data for 
Ireland: artificially raising the current account surplus and distorting the 
measured growth rate of both GDP and GNI/GNP. This has made it very difficult 
                                                          
32  
The author would like to thank the staff of the CSO, and Michael Connolly in particular, for very extensive assistance 
in preparing this paper. The author would also like to thank Shane Enright of the Department of Finance and 
colleagues in the ESRI for important advice and assistance. However, the author alone is responsible for the contents 
of this paper. 
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to understand recent developments in the Irish economy unless these rather 
arcane national accounting issues are taken into account. It is likely that problems 
in interpreting the accounts will continue in the future. 
 
While these problems are experienced in a more exaggerated form in Ireland, 
they do significantly affect the data for some other countries.33 As globalisation 
continues it is likely that these problems will come to be seen as of more general 
concern across a range of developed economies. 
 
Section 2 of this note briefly discusses the background to these problems in terms 
of changes in trade and the structure of economies. These changes are illustrated 
with data for Ireland in Section 3. Sections 4 to 8 discuss the five problem areas, 
identified above, where particular issues of interpretation arise and conclusions 
are drawn in Section 9. 
 
2. Background 
At its most basic, countries import goods and services which they do not 
themselves produce – for example oil – and they export natural resources that 
they do possess and that other countries do not. However, trade goes far beyond 
goods that are specific to individual countries. One factor driving trade is what is 
referred to as the law of comparative advantage; also, as Adam Smith identified 
in the 18th century, firms (and countries) have tended to specialise to reap 
economies of scale. For small economies this specialisation has always 
necessitated significant trade to ensure the availability of the wide range of goods 
that the economy required. Where capital and skilled labour are abundant, this 
has resulted in a specialisation in the production of goods and services which 
have a high-skilled labour and capital content. By contrast, poorer countries tend 
to export goods with a higher unskilled labour content. Today, even large 
economies do not produce the full range of goods and services that they need. 
 
A result of these processes is that a growing share of the output of individual 
countries is accounted for by trade, as the range of products and services that 
they produce narrows, while the range of goods and services that they consume 
expands. This results in a significant increase in the share of trade in GDP. 
 
Side-by-side with this increase in the share of trade in individual economies there 
has been a change in how economies operate, as the production process for 
                                                          
33
  For example, in the Netherlands: see Rojas-Romagosa and van der Horst, 2015. 
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goods and services is itself broken up, so that parts of a good or service are 
produced in a wide range of different locations, very often by a wide range of 
firms. They are gradually assembled into the final product, with the process of 
final assembly also possibly being spread over a number of countries. This has 
resulted in a growing proportion of trade being accounted for by intermediate 
products which are used in making other goods and services. 
 
The process of globalisation has become even more complex in recent years, with 
companies producing goods and services across a range of different countries 
(Byrne and O’Brien, 2015). For example, German capital and labour may be 
combined by a German firm to produce some of the most sophisticated parts of a 
car, a car which is finished in a subsidiary of the German firm in Slovakia using 
Slovakian physical capital and labour. In addition, some of the parts used in 
making the car may be sourced in many different locations. The result of this 
process is that a sophisticated product or service may contain value added from a 
range of different economies. It has also meant that the share of domestic value 
added in gross output has fallen in many economies as more and more of the 
value of the final product or service (gross output) is produced elsewhere. This 
means that trends in gross output, including exports, may not provide a clear 
picture of what is happening to value added (GDP) in an individual economy, as 
domestic value added accounts for a diminishing share of gross output.34 
 
Finally, over time, multinational enterprises have grown in importance. When 
they operate in countries outside their home location, the profits earned by those 
companies in the foreign destination properly belong to the shareholders in the 
company, rather than to the residents of the country in which the profits are 
generated.35 This drives a wedge between GDP and GNI/GNP as the profits, net of 
tax, are remitted to the shareholder.36 
 
3. Recent Trends in Key Variables 
Figure 1 shows the growth in world trade relative to world GDP since 1970. With 
the exception of the great recession years of 2008 and 2009, world trade has 
grown more rapidly than GDP, as a result of the process of globalisation. This 
reflects the fact that, world-wide, the process of globalisation sees an ever larger 
share of final demand being met from goods and services produced in other 
countries. 
                                                          
34
  Rojas-Romagosa and van der Horst, 2015. 
35
  Obviously, to the extent that taxes are payable on those profits some of the gross profits earned in the country will 
remain as a benefit for those living in that country. 
36
  Even if not immediately remitted they are accrued and flow back out to the owner as an outflow on the current 
account of the Balance of Payments. 
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FIGURE 1  World Trade Relative to GDP 
 
 
Source:  NIESR NiGEM model database. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the fact that this is a common experience within the EU and is 
not confined to small countries. The figure shows the ratio of imports to final 
demand for three countries – Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany. In each case 
the share of imports has risen significantly over the last 20 years. 
FIGURE 2  Ratio of Imports to Final Demand, Current Prices 
 
 
Source:  EU AMECO database. 
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Within the manufacturing sector the share of the output of the sector which is 
accounted for by intermediate inputs of goods and services is also tending to 
grow. Figure 3 shows that for Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden, 
intermediate inputs accounted for a higher share of Gross Value Added (GVA) in 
manufacturing in 2011 than they did in the early 1990s. 
 
FIGURE 3  Intermediate Inputs as Share of Gross Output, Manufacturing 
 
 
Sources:  Eurostat and CSO Census of Industrial Production. 
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FIGURE 4  Ireland, High Tech Manufacturing, Factor Shares 
 
 
Source:  CSO Census of Industrial Production. 
 
Figure 4 shows data for a longer period for Ireland for the pharmaceutical and 
engineering (including computers) sector. Whereas in the 1970s GVA accounted 
for 40 per cent of the gross output of the sector, by 2010 the share of GVA had 
fallen to 30 per cent. In addition, the Figure also shows that the labour share of 
value added declined dramatically in this sector in Ireland. In the 1970s it 
accounted for around 20 per cent of the gross output of the sector, but by the 
end of the period it accounted for only 5 per cent. As most of the output of the 
sector was produced by foreign firms, the impact on GNI or GNP is confined to 
the wage bill and the corporation tax paid on the profits; the rest of the profits 
are repatriated. Thus the share of the gross output (and exports) from the sector 
that has a lasting impact on the Irish economy (contributing to GNP) was quite 
small by 2010. (Albeit, because of the very large output, the small share of that 
output that contributed to GNP was very important to the Irish economy.) As 
discussed below, this means that trends in exports (gross output) may not be a 
good guide to trends in GNI or GNP, as the share of gross output that contributes 
to GNP is falling over time. 
 
4. The Patent Cliff 
The pharmaceutical sector accounts for an exceptionally large share of GVA in the 
Irish economy. The latest CSO data show that the foreign-owned firms in the 
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sector accounted for over 11 per cent of GVA in Ireland in 2013 (there is very 
limited production of pharmaceuticals by Irish-owned firms). Nearly all of the 
major international pharmaceutical companies have plants in Ireland. While they 
are important employers, the actual impact of the sector on GNI/GNP is much 
more limited than the value added figures would suggest. This is because of the 
fact that the vast bulk of the output is produced by foreign firms and the profits 
from the activity in Ireland, with the exception of the corporation tax paid in 
Ireland, accrue to their foreign parents. Thus the eventual impact of the activity 
in these firms on Irish GNI/GNP depends on the size of the wage bill and the 
corporation tax paid on their profits in Ireland. 
 
At the end of 2011 and through 2012 a number of major drugs produced in 
Ireland fell out of patent. In particular Lipitor, produced by Pfizer in Ireland, went 
off patent first in the US and then in Europe and Japan between the end of 2011 
and the end of 2012 (FitzGerald, 2013a). This resulted in a reduction in revenue 
for the company of around US$5.5 billion (around 2.5 per cent of Irish GDP). In 
turn, this reduction in revenue was reflected in a reduction in Irish exports. To the 
extent that the patented drug was replaced by an unpatented generic this was 
treated as a fall in volume rather than a fall in price.37 This had a big effect on the 
preliminary estimate of the growth rate of GDP (and exports) in 2012 and 2013. 
 
However, the latest version of the national accounts (National Income and 
Expenditure, 2013) paints a rather different picture. When the accounts for the 
year were finalised, it would appear that the drug companies cut the price of 
their branded products rather than switching to the production of generics; 
hence there was not a major fall in volume and the earlier estimates prepared by 
the CSO have been revised. Also a range of new drugs began production in the 
sector in the period masking the impact of the loss of patents. As a result, the 
GVA in the sector fell in real terms in 2012 by 0.7 per cent and by 3.7 per cent in 
2013. By contrast the current price GVA in the sector fell in 2012 and 2013 by 4.5 
per cent and 30.7 per cent respectively. Because of the size of the sector in the 
economy, the fall in the price deflator in 2013 had a significant effect on the price 
deflator for GVA (and GDP) in the economy as a whole. However, the impact on 
the measured growth rate for GDP was much more limited than had been 
suggested in the preliminary national accounts published for 2012 and 2013 
(discussed in FitzGerald, 2013a). 
 
                                                          
37
  The patented drug was treated as a different product from the generic. Thus there was a discontinuity in the 
production process and both drugs were dropped from calculating a price index. Instead the price index was 
calculated based on all other drugs and it was used to deflate the value series to produce a volume series. The result 
was a major fall in volume. This is the standard approach adopted in the US national accounts for such drugs. 
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The wage bill in the sector fell by 1.1 per cent in 2012 but it actually rose by 1.6 
per cent in 2013. The very substantial fall in profits, in particular in 2013, will have 
had a negative impact on corporation tax payments. However, with the exception 
of the tax payments, the rest of the loss of profits will have served to reduce 
profit repatriations. As a result, the impact of the loss of patent on GNI/GNP and 
on the current account in 2012 and 2013 will have been very limited. 
 
5. The IT Sector 
In 2013 9.6 per cent of GVA in the Irish economy was accounted for by foreign-
owned firms (FDI) in the computer services and related sectors (NACE 58-63).38 
This sector has manifested a rather different pattern of behaviour to that of the 
pharmaceuticals sector. 
 
As shown in Table 1, GVA arising in the sector (NACE 62 and 63) has grown by 50 
per cent since the crisis began in 2008. Also, wages form quite a large share of 
the total GVA – rising from 38 per cent in 2005 to 43 per cent in 2013. In 2011, 
the latest year for which such data are available, the total output of the sector 
was around €26 billion with around €21 billion of inputs – largely payment for 
royalties and licenses and the residue of GVA being just over €5 billion. Much of 
the profit arising in the sector effectively flows out as royalties, rather than being 
included in profits in Ireland, subject to Irish tax. 
 
TABLE 1  GVA and its Components Current Prices, Computer Programming, Consultancy and Information 
Services Activities (NACE 62, 63), € million 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GVA current prices 4,027 3,998 4,121 5,103 4,183 5,215 5,217 6,345 7,614 
% change  -0.7 3.1 23.8 -18.0 24.7 0.0 21.6 20.0 
Gross operating Surplus 2,449 2,228 2,313 2,952 1,899 2,822 2,574 3,157 4,293 
Wages etc. 1,540 1,727 1,763 2,101 2,228 2,333 2,582 3,125 3,259 
Indirect Taxes etc. 38 43 44 50 56 60 61 63 62 
 
Source:  CSO National Income and Expenditure, 2013. 
 
Table 2 shows GVA arising in the computer services sector at constant prices. As 
can be seen from this Table, the GVA at constant prices has behaved very 
erratically over time with large rises and falls from year to year. In 2013 the GVA 
in the sector fell by over 57 per cent. On its own this had a negative impact on 
                                                          
38
  http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/gvafm/grossvalueaddedforforeign-
ownedmultinationalenterprisesandothersectorsannualresultsfor2013/#.VWNPUka-POU. 
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GVA for the economy as a whole of -2.3 percentage points in 2013. However, as 
shown in Table 1, GVA at current prices actually rose in 2013. 
 
TABLE 2  GVA, Constant Prices, Computer Programming, Consultancy and Information Service Activities 
(NACE 62, 63) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GVA, constant prices 9,049 8,012 6,843 5,941 5,048 4,641 4,752 6,345 2,705 
% change 34.2 -11.5 -14.6 -13.2 -15.0 -8.1 2.4 33.5 -57.4 
% of GVA for economy 6.3 5.4 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.1 3.0 4.0 1.7 
 
Source:  CSO National Income and Expenditure, 2013. 
 
Because the GVA in the sector is produced largely by foreign-owned firms, the 
bulk of the profits earned in the sector flow back out as profit repatriations and 
the effect on GNI/GNP will be largely determined by the pattern of growth in the 
wage bill. As can be seen from Table 1, this has showed continuous growth over 
the period 2005-2013. Thus, while the effect of this sector on growth in GDP was 
very volatile over the period, the impact on GNP is likely to have been much 
smoother, involving pretty continuous growth. 
 
The very large fall in GVA at constant prices, in spite of the big rise at current 
prices, reflects a rather unusual pattern of deflation of the large amount of inputs 
in the sector (royalties). However, with consistent deflation of inputs used in the 
sector, and of imports of royalties and of repatriated profits, the net effect on 
GNP of the very large fall in GVA in constant prices should be limited. This 
suggests that while developments in this sector had a major negative effect on 
the measured growth in real GDP in the economy in 2013, the sector may actually 
have contributed to growth in GNI/GNP. However, the divergence between the 
current and constant price figures looks very unusual and it is difficult to 
explain.39 
 
As in the case of the pharmaceutical sector, the issues discussed here may well 
arise for other countries with similar industries. However, the large size of the 
sector relative to the Irish economy means that the accounting problems loom 
much larger in the Irish national accounts. 
 
                                                          
39
  The fall in volume of GVA arises because of a very large increase in the volume of inputs relative to Gross Output 
(GVA=Gross Output-Inputs). However, this does not appear to be the case in the current price flows where GVA 
actually increases. 
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6. Redomiciled plcs 
Over the last few years a number of companies have relocated their 
headquarters to Ireland without generating any real activity in the economy in 
terms of employment or purchases of domestic inputs (FitzGerald, 2013b). These 
companies, referred to technically as redomiciled plcs, hold major investments 
elsewhere in the world but they have established a legal presence in Ireland. This 
means that their profits are paid to them in Ireland even though, under double 
taxation agreements, their tax liability arises in other jurisdictions. While they 
receive large profits in Ireland, because they are headquartered here, they pay 
out only some of these profits to their shareholders abroad when they declare a 
dividend. The retained earnings in Ireland enhance the value of the companies. 
As a result, the recorded inflows into the economy, which these firms generate, 
are much larger than the recorded outflows. However, the benefits of the 
retained profits of redomiciled plcs are attributable to their foreign owners – 
there is no benefit to the Irish economy. Nonetheless, using the standard 
SNA/ESA accounting procedures, this has the effect of raising the measured 
current account surplus in the Balance of Payments and increasing the level of 
nominal GNI/GNP arising in Ireland.  
 
The treatment of these redomiciled plcs in the national accounts differs from the 
treatment of the profits of many of the multinationals already operating in the 
Irish economy in the manufacturing or services sector because, crucially, these 
latter multinationals are not headquartered in Ireland. These latter multinational 
firms also generate very substantial profits in Ireland; however, these profits are 
entirely attributed to their foreign owners and flow out as factor income. They 
also generate major activity in the economy through employment, payment of 
tax and purchase of Irish goods and services. Even if the profits of the 
multinationals operating in manufacturing or services do not flow back out as 
dividends, but are instead retained as earnings, they are still treated as an 
outflow in the current account of the Balance of Payments (as reinvested 
earnings). Thus, while the profits of these companies raise GDP, the “reinvested 
earnings” are deducted to calculate GNI/GNP. This means that the substantial 
benefit to the Irish economy which arises from the activities of these companies 
as employers or taxpayers is fully accounted for but the profits, which are due to 
their foreign owners, are excluded from GNI/GNP and the current account 
balance. 
 
Redomiciled plcs, which are engaged in investing in global financial assets, grew 
very rapidly in importance from a relatively low level in 2008 to peak in 2012. This 
growth may have been partly driven by expectations of changes in the tax code in 
other jurisdictions. Whatever the reason, they are now exerting a major impact 
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on the Irish national accounts and on the current account of the Balance of 
Payments. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
TABLE 3  Net Profit Flows for Redomiciled plcs, € million 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Undistributed Profits 1,563 5,177 5,715 7,400 6,800 6,900 
As % of GDP 0.9 3.1 3.3 4.3 3.9 3.7 
As % of GNP 1.1 3.7 4.1 5.2 4.6 4.4 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on CSO Balance of Payments and consultations with the CSO. 
 
Set out in Table 3 is an estimate of the undistributed profits of these companies 
between 2009 and 2014. Having risen rapidly in the period 2009-2012 they 
appear to have plateaued in 2013 and 2014. 
 
As can be seen from the Table, from 2009 to 2012 there was a dramatic rise in 
the profits of these companies. While the dividends paid out have averaged just 
under 30 per cent of the total, these retained earnings are very large. As shown in 
Table 3, by 2012 they amounted to 5.2 per cent of GNP. 
 
FIGURE 5  GNP Adjusted for Undistributed Profits of Redomiciled plcs. 
 
 
Source:  CSO: National Income and Expenditure 2013 and additional data from the CSO. 
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The change in the undistributed profits of these companies as a share of GNP is a 
measure of the extent to which the measurement of GNP (and GNI) has been 
inflated by the activity of these firms over the last five years, without a 
compensating reduction affecting GNP through increased factor outflows. As 
shown in Figure 5, while the latest national accounts estimates for 2012 suggest 
that GNP grew by 1.1 per cent on the previous year, if allowance is made for the 
undistributed profits of the redomiciled plcs, there was actually a decline in the 
volume of output of 0.1 per cent. With very substantial growth in 2010 in these 
undistributed profits, the growth rate of GNP for that year, which is shown in the 
national accounts as having been just under 1.4 per cent, would be transformed 
into a fall in GNP of around 1.2 per cent when these payments are taken into 
account. Because all of the flows into and out of Ireland occur as factor income 
there is no impact on the figures for GDP. 
 
If the current account of the Balance of Payments was adjusted to exclude the 
redomiciled plcs, this would imply that, instead of having a current account 
surplus of around 6.2 per cent of GDP in 2014, there was actually a surplus of 
around 2.5 per cent of GDP. 
 
When these adjustments are taken into account it makes a big difference to how 
one understands the recent development of the Irish economy. It also means that 
while the economy appears to be running a very large current account surplus in 
2015, the underlying situation is rather different with the surplus being much 
smaller in magnitude.40 
 
Ireland is not unique in having this problem with headquartered companies, 
which have little economic presence, boosting the current account surplus. The 
Netherlands has a similar problem, though there it does not seem to have as 
much impact on the current account of the Balance of Payments (Jansen and 
Rojas-Romagosa, 2015). 
 
                                                          
40
  An implication of these data is that the large retained earnings of the redomiciled plcs, as well as adding to the 
current account surplus, also raise Gross National Income (GNI) – the base on which Irish contributions to the EU 
Budget are calculated. (The budgetary contribution of all Member States is set as a specified percentage of GNI). 
Thus, while these companies confer no significant benefit on the Irish economy in terms of employment or taxes, 
they do give rise to a higher EU budgetary contribution by Ireland. 
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7. Trade in Goods and Services Manufactured Offshore 
There has been a change in national accounting rules affecting how trade is 
recorded.41 This change affects the treatment of goods which are manufactured 
abroad for a domestic company and then subsequently sold abroad. 
 
In the trade statistics, and in the old national accounting treatment, when a firm 
located in one country, such as Ireland, has goods manufactured for it in another 
country (e.g. China), these goods do not appear in the recorded trade of the 
country in which the firm organising the manufacturing is located (e.g. Ireland) 
unless the goods are physically shipped to that country. 
 
However, in the latest treatment of trade in the national accounts, the key issue 
is when and where a change in ownership of the goods takes place. Under the 
new convention, if a company in Ireland has goods manufactured on its behalf in 
another country (e.g. China) the key issue is where and when the goods change 
ownership. If the Irish firm takes delivery (ownership) of the goods in China they 
are treated as an import into Ireland (where the owner is located). Then, if the 
goods are sold in a third country, they are treated as an export from Ireland to 
that third country. Under this treatment in the national accounts, it does not 
matter if the goods never pass through Ireland, because an Irish firm had 
ownership of the goods the purchase and sale of the goods is recorded in the 
Irish national accounting trade data. The goods will still only be recorded in the 
trade statistics for Ireland if they pass through Ireland. 
 
This change in national accounting rules affects both firms in Ireland undertaking 
contract manufacturing for firms abroad and also where Irish firms have goods 
manufactured abroad for them. 
 
The first case affected by the change in treatment is where a firm located in 
Ireland undertakes processing activities on contract for a firm located abroad. In 
recent years a significant amount of goods, which have been processed in Ireland 
for foreign companies, appear in the trade statistics as imports when they are 
brought to Ireland for processing and then, subsequently, as exports when they 
have been processed. Under the previous accounting conventions this movement 
of goods also showed up in trade in the national accounts. However, under the 
new rules, while the movement of the goods still appears in the trade statistics as 
                                                          
41
   A new version of the national accounting definitions, ESA2010, has been gradually implemented by all Member States 
of the EU. With the publication of the next edition of National Income and Expenditure, the CSO will have fully 
implemented the changes required to conform to the new national accounting standard. 
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imports and exports, it does not now appear in the national accounts 
merchandise trade. Instead, the payment to the firm located in Ireland for 
undertaking the processing on contract for the foreign owner of the goods is 
treated as a service export. 
 
An example of this is the case where valuable pharmaceuticals have been sent to 
Ireland in powder form to be turned into tablets. The movement of the powder 
to Ireland for processing and the export of the finished pills do not now appear in 
merchandise trade in the national accounts because the ownership of the 
pharmaceutical powder at all times remained with the foreign firm. 
 
In the case of this “temporary” import of goods for processing, the effect is to 
drive a wedge between the trade statistics and the national accounts, rendering 
the trade statistics a poor guide to what is actually happening in the economy 
when this kind of trade is large. The net benefit to GDP (and GNP if the processor 
is Irish-owned) is the payment for the service rendered to the foreign company – 
a service export. This can be quite small relative to the value of the good being 
processed (for example where valuable pharmaceuticals in powder form are 
transformed into pills). 
 
The effects on the national accounts are rather different where goods are 
manufactured abroad on behalf of firms located in Ireland, whether or not the 
firms in Ireland are Irish or foreign multinational enterprises (MNE’s). 
 
Under the previous national accounting rules, where a company had goods 
manufactured abroad on its behalf, these goods were only treated as an import 
into the country of the firm commissioning the manufacture of the goods if the 
goods were physically imported into the country where that company, the owner 
of the goods, resided. Then, if imported into the owner’s country and sold abroad 
they would have been treated as an export. 
 
In the case of MNEs, it is much more usual that the goods are shipped from the 
country where they were manufactured directly to the country where they are 
consumed, without passing through the country where the MNE resides (e.g. 
Ireland). In that case, under the old accounting rules, they would not have 
appeared in the national accounting trade data of the country where the owner 
resided (e.g. Ireland). 
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Under the new set of rules, the key issue is the ownership of the goods. An 
example of such an arrangement would be where a company, which 
manufactures electronic products, has the products made abroad for sale to the 
rest of the world. In this case the company would take ownership of the products 
when they are completed in the factory abroad and it would only relinquish 
ownership when they were sold to the final customer, also abroad. If the firm 
were located in Ireland the goods manufactured abroad and sold abroad, without 
physically passing through Ireland, do not appear in the trade statistics for Irish 
imports and exports (or in the national accounts under the old rules). However, 
under the latest convention, they appear as an import in the national accounts 
when the company takes delivery of them in the foreign country and they are 
then treated as an export when they are sold in a third country. 
 
The effect of this is that the value of exports and imports is higher in the national 
accounts than in the trade statistics, which are based on the physical movement 
of goods. A more detailed treatment of the issues involved is given in Byrne and 
O’Brien, 2015. 
 
FIGURE 6  Ratio of National Accounts Merchandise Exports to Trade Statistics 
 
 
Source:  CSO. 
 
Figure 6 shows the ratio of national accounts exports to trade statistics exports in 
recent years, which is an indicator of the significance of this contract 
manufacturing. As can be seen from this graph, this pattern, where firms have 
goods produced abroad for onward sale as an export, was not very significant 
until 2012. However, a significant proportion of Irish exports were actually 
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manufactured abroad, especially in the first half of 2014. This served to raise 
value added in Ireland in spite of the fact that domestic factors of production 
were not used in the production of the goods. 
 
Where a firm has goods manufactured abroad on its behalf the difference 
between the imports, what the firm pays the foreign producer, and the exports, 
what the firm gets when the goods are sold abroad, is the company’s profit. 
Where a firm undertaking this activity resides in Ireland (and the trade is recorded 
in the Irish national accounts) the profit will thus accrue in Ireland. This profit (the 
difference between the value of the export and the cost of the import) will add to 
Irish GDP. However, if the firm is a foreign-owned MNE then the profit, after tax, 
will flow back out as factor income. In this latter case there would be very little 
effect from the transaction on Irish GNP.42 
 
It is understood that most of this activity was undertaken by foreign MNE’s 
residing in Ireland so that most of the profits arising from these “exports” will 
have flowed back out as factor income. Thus the effect of these large exports in 
2014 was to raise GDP but it will have had little or no effect on GNI/GNP. 
 
The growth of this phenomenon is making the national accounts data for exports 
a misleading guide to real activity in the Irish economy. In biasing upwards 
domestic value added, where no domestic factors of production are used in the 
production process, it will complicate modelling of the economy. Once again it 
shows the importance of concentrating attention on GNI/GNP rather than GDP. 
 
This problem is not unique to Ireland. It is also a problem for those using US data. 
However, it is understood that in the US the gross trade flows are not included in 
the US national accounts data for exports and imports. However, the value added 
accruing to the US companies from having their products produced abroad, for 
sale to third countries, is included in the GVA of the relevant sector in the US. In 
the case of the IT sector, this will boost GVA, while no US factors of production 
are used in the actual production process. This will boost US measured 
productivity. 
 
8. Aircraft Leasing 
This summer, when the first full set of national accounting data for Ireland are 
published in National Income and Expenditure, 2014, the CSO will make one 
                                                          
42
  The corporation tax paid in Ireland on the firms’ profits would be the only factor adding to GNP. 
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further change in accounting conventions to bring the accounts fully into line 
with the latest accounting standards. This will involve incorporating all the 
transactions involved in aircraft leasing on a gross flows basis. At present this 
business is included in the national accounts on a limited basis where some key 
gross flows are netted off and where the aircraft involved are treated as a 
financial asset rather than a physical asset. The leasing income (c. €8 billion) is 
included as a service export but the aircraft used do not appear in the trade flows 
or the physical capital stock. 
 
The changes being made to accounting practices will be significant as they will, to 
some extent, change the measured current account balance. As this is a key 
indicator of what is happening in the economy the change in its magnitude will be 
important. In addition, because of the size of the sector, the inclusion of the gross 
flows related to the sector will further complicate the interpretation of the data 
on trade. When the CSO publish the new data in the summer this change will 
probably be implemented retrospectively back to the early 2000s. 
 
Already the presence of Ryanair in Ireland is affecting the national accounts in an 
appreciable manner. With Ryanair planning to acquire 180 new Boeing 737 
aircraft over the next four years this will show up as a significant rise in imports. 
This import of aircraft will be counterbalanced by a rise in investment, so the 
immediate impact of the transactions will not directly affect GDP. However, it will 
have a considerable immediate impact on the current account of the Balance of 
Payments. This will be offset, over time, by exports of transport services, which 
should eventually more than offset the cost of the aircraft.43 However, the initial 
impact is likely to be a deterioration in the current account position. It will also 
make the movement of investment and imports even more volatile and more 
difficult to interpret. 
 
The key change in the accounting treatment will involve including the import of 
aircraft by the leasing companies in merchandise imports and then including the 
same aircraft in the investment figures. The effect of these two changes will 
cancel each other out insofar as they affect GNP and GDP. 
 
In the case of the aircraft leasing firms, nearly all of them are foreign-owned. 
They employ a relatively small number of people in Ireland, they buy a limited 
range of services locally, such as legal and accountancy services, and they pay 
corporation tax on their profits; this is their contribution to the Irish economy. 
                                                          
43
  That assumes that Ryanair continues to trade profitably. 
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However the gross flows relating to aircraft leasing are treated in the national 
accounts, the final impact on GNI or GNP of the presence in Ireland of aircraft 
leasing companies is relatively small. 
 
Insofar as their profits arise in Ireland these profits will be remitted by the Irish 
company to their foreign owner as factor income paid abroad. In addition, 
because the bulk of the funding for these companies comes in the form of debt 
finance, there is a very substantial outflow of interest paid abroad under primary 
income. Together the outflows of primary income partly offset the inflows of 
leasing payments so that the companies have a positive impact on the current 
account at present. Probably the best way to illustrate the significance of the 
change in national accounting treatment is to use a stylised example of an aircraft 
leasing company and to consider how its activities would impact on the national 
accounts under the old and the new conventions. 
 
Stylised Example 
Table 4 shows an example of the balance sheet for a stylised aircraft leasing 
company. In this case in year one it is assumed that the company has a stock of 
aircraft worth €1 billion. It is financed by 70 per cent debt and 30 per cent equity. 
It is assumed that it increases its net stock of aircraft by €100 million in year two. 
This includes the purchase of replacement aircraft of €50 million due to 
depreciation and the purchase of additional aircraft amounting to €100 million. 
(Without any investment the stock of aircraft would fall in value by €50 million 
due to the depreciation of the existing stock of aircraft.) 
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TABLE 4  Accounts of a Stylised Leasing Company 
 Old Basis New Basis Old Basis New Basis 
Year 1 1 2 2 
Balance Sheet     
Assets (aircraft) 1000 1000 1100 1100 
Liabilities     
Debt 700 700 770 770 
Equity 300 300 330 330 
     
Profit and Loss     
Income     
Leasing Revenue 100 100 110 110 
Expenses     
Irish costs (labour etc.) 5 5 5.5 5.5 
Debt interest 28 28 30.8 30.8 
Depreciation 50 50 55 55 
Profit before tax 17 17 18.7 18.7 
Tax 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 
Profit after tax 14.9 14.9 16.4 16.4 
 
Source:  Author. 
 
 
Table 4 also shows a profit and loss statement for the same stylised leasing 
company. It is assumed that the leasing income of the firm is equivalent to 10 per 
cent of the value of its stock of aircraft. It is also assumed that it pays a rate of 
interest of 4 per cent on its debt and that the depreciation on the aircraft is at a 
rate of 5 per cent.44 This rate of depreciation is slightly higher than what would be 
arrived at on the basis of straight line depreciation with the expected life of an 
aircraft being 25 years. However, some acceleration in the depreciation in the 
early years of an asset would not be unusual. Irish labour costs are assumed to be 
5 per cent of leasing income. These are assumed to include the labour content of 
services bought in Ireland (e.g. legal and accountancy services). 
 
On this basis the company made a profit in year one of €45 million before 
deduction of interest and before tax. After deduction of interest payments the 
profit would be €17 million in year one. Tax is assumed to be paid at a rate of 
12.5 per cent on the profit after deduction of interest and depreciation. 
 
                                                          
44
  The assumptions made here are broadly consistent with published accounts for such companies. 
60 | Qua rt er ly  Econom ic  Comme nt ary  –  Sum me r 2 01 5  
In year two it is assumed that the company expands its stock of aircraft by a net 
€100 million. The funding of this investment is assumed to be on the basis of the 
same debt/equity ratio as in year one. 
 
TABLE 5  Output side of the National Accounts of Stylised Leasing Company Operations 
 Old Basis New Basis Old Basis New Basis 
Year 1 1 2 2 
Output     
GVA 100 100 110 110 
Wages 5 5 5.5 5.5 
Profit before interest 95 45 104.5 49.5 
Depreciation 0 50 0 55 
     
Contribution to GDP 100.0 100.0 110.0 110.0 
Factor outflows 42.9 42.9 47.2 47.2 
    Debt interest 28.0 28.0 30.8 30.8 
    Profits repatriated 14.9 14.9 16.4 16.4 
Contribution to GNP 57.1 57.1 62.8 62.8 
Contribution to NNP 57.1 7.1 62.8 7.8 
 
Source:  Author. 
 
Table 5 then shows the impact of this on the output side of the national accounts 
in year one and year two, both on the basis of the current national accounting 
rules and also on the rules to be implemented this summer. Under the old 
accounting treatment there would be no depreciation deducted as there were 
considered to be no physical assets in Ireland to depreciate (the aircraft). 
However, under the new treatment, the depreciation, identified in the company 
accounts, is also treated as depreciation in the national accounts. This difference 
in treatment does not affect GDP or GNP but it does affect Net National Product 
(NNP). 
 
In the old accounting treatment, while the allowance for depreciation in the 
company accounts was treated as a profit for national accounting purposes it was 
not treated as being remitted as profit by the foreign multinational. Instead the 
depreciation, as calculated in the company’s accounts, would flow back out on 
the financial account of the Balance of Payments. Thus there is no difference 
between the profit outflows under the new and the old national accounting 
treatments. 
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On this basis the addition to GNP in year one as a result of the operations of the 
leasing company would be €57.1 million. However, when the depreciation on the 
aircraft is taken into account the effect on net national product NNP would be 
€7.1 million, equivalent to the wages and the corporation tax paid in Ireland.  
 
TABLE 6  Expenditure side of the National Accounts for Stylised Leasing Company Operations 
 Old Basis New Basis Old Basis New Basis 
Year 1 1 2 2 
Investment   0 150 
Export Services 100 100 110 110 
Imports   0 150 
     
Contribution to GDP 100 100 110 110 
Factor outflows 42.9 42.9 47.2 47.2 
    Debt interest 28.0 28.0 30.8 30.8 
    Profits repatriated 14.9 14.9 16.4 16.4 
Contribution to GNP 57.1 57.1 62.8 62.8 
 
Source:  Author. 
 
Table 6 shows the expenditure side of the national accounts on the new and the 
old basis. Here there is a significant change through the inclusion of the imports 
of new aircraft in year two. In the case of year two, where there is assumed to be 
an import of €150 million of aircraft, this shows up in imports and investment 
under the new national accounting convention, whereas these two items are 
omitted in the current national accounts treatment, where the stock of aircraft is 
treated as a financial asset. Because the imports and the investment cancel, there 
is no change in the effect on GDP and GNP as a result of the change in 
accounting. 
 
TABLE 7  Current Account of the Balance of Payments for Stylised Leasing Company Operations 
 Old Basis New Basis Old Basis New Basis 
Year 1 1 2 2 
Exports 100 100 110 110 
Imports 0 0 0 150 
Net Factor Income -42.9 -42.9 -47.2 -47.2 
Balance 57.1 57.1 62.8 -87.2 
 
Source:  Author. 
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Table 7 shows the effect of the change in accounting conventions on the current 
account of the Balance of Payments. In this case there is a significant change from 
the current treatment to the new treatment of the physical stock of aircraft. 
Under the existing treatment the current account is in surplus, even when the 
stock of aircraft is increasing in year two. However, under the new treatment 
there is a deficit in year two when new aircraft are bought. The turnaround is 
equivalent to the cost of the purchase of the aircraft i.e. -€150 million.  
 
The new treatment is more appropriate than the old treatment. However, it does 
highlight a problem in assessing the economic significance of a current account 
surplus or deficit. In the case of the new treatment, the negative current account 
balance as a result of the aircraft leasing operation would appear, on the face of 
it, to be adverse for domestic welfare. However, as represented by the increase, 
albeit small, in NNP there is a positive impact in welfare even when the leasing 
firm is building up its stock of aircraft through imports. While there is an apparent 
conflict between these two measures it is not a real difference.  
 
The current account statement for year two under the new treatment takes 
account of the cost of the aircraft but it does not take account of the lifetime 
income from owning that aircraft. The NNP measure gives a better indication of 
the long-term benefit from the investment. A true measure of the welfare impact 
on the economy of the investment in new aircraft would require the initial cost of 
the import of aircraft to be offset against the lifetime leasing income and costs of 
operation of the aircraft. In that case the investment by the leasing company 
would also be seen as being beneficial to the economy on the basis of a 
cumulative improvement in the current account over the lifetime of the aircraft. 
 
This problem arises in all cases where there is a surge in productive investment. 
Provided that the investment does prove productive when installed, there is a 
benefit to society from that investment. With the activities of aircraft leasing 
companies building up quite rapidly in the next few years this will have a negative 
impact on the current account of the Balance of Payments measured using the 
new convention. However, if and when the stock of aircraft stabilises, then the 
current account would move into surplus as the leasing income exceeded the cost 
of aircraft replacement.  
 
This new treatment of aircraft leasing is more appropriate than the current (old) 
treatment. The old treatment “flatters” the current account as the leasing income 
is included but not the import of the capital stock on which it depends. By 
contrast, in the early years, as the capital stock builds up through imports of 
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aircraft, the result of the new treatment will be to paint an unduly unfavourable 
picture of the current account. This is because the import of aircraft will be 
included but not the full flow of leasing income that the capital stock generates 
because that only accrues over the relatively long lifetime of the aircraft. 
 
Scale of Aircraft Leasing 
The aircraft leasing sector has risen rapidly in size in Ireland over the last decade. 
According to one report almost 20 per cent of the world’s civil aircraft fleet is 
owned by leasing companies in Ireland.45 While this is probably an overestimate 
of the true size of the sector, nonetheless it is very large relative to the size of the 
Irish economy and this change in accounting treatment could dwarf the effects on 
the current account of the Balance of Payments of Ryanair’s purchase of aircraft 
over the next four years. 
 
The web sites of ten companies operating in Ireland suggest that they have 4,000 
aircraft, a figure roughly consistent with the suggested value of the assets of the 
sector in Ireland shown above. However, there are reasons to believe that this 
figure exaggerates the true size of the sector. In a significant proportion of cases 
the firms do not distinguish between ownership and management of aircraft 
when aggregating the aircraft they control. This distinction is important as, if they 
only manage the aircraft, their revenue will cover the management costs (and 
profits) but not the depreciation or remuneration of the capital. Also, in this latter 
case the aircraft would not form part of the Irish capital stock. 
 
TABLE 8 Services Exports, Leasing Income, € million 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Operational leasing 1,752 2,110 4,076 5,439 5,803 5,764 5,729 6,699 6,812 7,537 7,497 
 
Source:  CSO, Balance of Payments. 
 
Table 8 shows the services export revenue from leasing, the bulk of which is in 
respect of aircraft leasing. In the case of one of the largest leasing companies, 
Avolon, the leasing income is roughly equal to 10 per cent of the value of the 
aircraft owned.46 Assuming that the position is similar for other leasing 
companies, the flow of leasing income would suggest that the value of the 
                                                          
45
  http://www.irishaviationresearchinstitute.blogspot.ie/p/ireland-aircraft-leasing-companies.html. 
46
  http://finance.yahoo.com/news/avolon-2014-fourth-quarter-full-110000464.html;_ylt=A0LEV0ngFShVh9kA32JX 
NyoA;_ylu=X3oDMTEzbGFkZ2FlBGNvbG8DYmYxBHBvcwM4BHZ0aWQDU01FOTU3XzEEc2VjA3Ny. 
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aircraft owned in 2013 was around €75 billion or just over 40 per cent of GDP, 
somewhat smaller than suggested in the reference above. 
 
The build-up of capital in the form of aircraft implied by the leasing income 
shown in Table 8 is quite rapid over the last decade. It implies that, over the 
decade from 2003 to 2013, the stock of aircraft rose by over €57 billion or €5.7 
billion a year. This would have amounted to between 3 per cent and 3.5 per cent 
of GDP each year over the decade. 
 
At present the value of the stock of aircraft managed in Ireland, and also the 
funding of those aircraft, are treated as financial assets and liabilities in the 
international investment position for Ireland and transactions in leased aircraft 
are recorded in the financial account of the Balance of Payments. However, when 
they move to being treated as a fully onshore activity, the stock of aircraft will be 
included as a physical asset of the renting and leasing sector (NACE 77). This 
would also represent an increase in the Irish capital stock of around 20 per cent, 
something that will have implications for the standard EU method for estimating 
potential output. 
 
The impact of all of these changes on the current account of the Balance of 
Payments in any one year is unclear. However, the concern is that there could be 
significant effects on the current account in individual years. However, as 
discussed above, over time, the net effect of all of these transactions undertaken 
by foreign-owned companies operating in Ireland should be small, representing 
their true impact on the economy. Nonetheless, until the details are fully teased 
out there remain concerns that this change in accounting treatment could further 
complicate the interpretation of what is going on in the “real” Irish economy. 
 
9. Finding Solutions 
In this paper the primary focus has been on problems in interpreting the Irish 
national accounts as the Irish economy is affected by many new facets of the 
globalisation process. In some cases other countries are tackling the same 
problems, but the magnitude and number of issues affecting the Irish accounts is 
probably quite unusual compared to other OECD economies. 
 
Many of the problems identified in this paper affect the data for exports and 
imports. Traditionally, these variables have provided important indications of 
what is happening in an economy. However, the data for Ireland are now subject 
to so many different “unusual” factors that they are no longer particularly useful 
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for this purpose. Instead it is more useful to concentrate on the current account 
of the Balance of Payments, in both current and constant prices – exports less 
imports and net factor income. Obviously an adjustment also needs to be made 
to this aggregate for the behaviour of redomiciled plcs. 
 
The change in the national accounting approach to goods which are 
manufactured abroad for firms resident in Ireland poses serious problems in 
understanding developments in the economy. It poses particular issues for those 
who want to model the production process. With the addition to GVA of 
substantial value added / output which is not produced with domestic factor 
inputs – capital and labour – traditional production functions will not make sense. 
Among other areas of economic analysis, this has serious implications for the way 
that potential output and the structural deficit is measured. 
 
More generally, in a globalised world, many of the problems that are arising with 
the national accounts are related to the definition of residence. However, the 
answer is not to change the definition, as the accounts provide an essential 
coherent and consistent framework across all economies. Rather, the answer is 
to provide more information on a standardised basis, which would allow the kind 
of anomalies identified in this paper to be taken into account, to provide a clearer 
picture of what is happening in an individual economy. 
 
In the case of Ireland the best solution is probably to focus on the output side of 
the accounts. The aim should be to identify the GNI/GNP arising from individual 
sectors of the economy. In the case of foreign-owned firms, the GNI/GNP effect 
will be confined to the wage bill and corporation tax paid. In the case of Irish-
owned companies the contribution will be the same as the GVA arising in the 
firm.47  As some sectors are dominated by foreign-owned companies this may 
simplify the task. Already the Irish CSO has gone some distance down this route in 
a recent publication.48 
 
To facilitate an understanding of current developments in the economy it would 
be useful to extend this approach to produce output indices which are weighted 
by the GNI/GNP contribution of each sector of the economy. 
 
                                                          
47 
 This is actually an oversimplification as the dividends paid to foreign shareholders in the Irish economy will also flow 
out of the economy. Also, both national debt interest paid abroad and the inflow of factor income are not readily 
attributable to a particular sector of the economy. 
48 
  http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/gvafm/grossvalueaddedforforeign-
ownedmultinationalenterprisesandothersectorsannualresultsfor2013/#.VWdPH0a-POU. 
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In the case of the redomiciled plcs it would have been much easier to interpret 
the data if their profits received in Ireland, which were not paid out as dividends, 
were accrued to the foreign owners. This is the approach with firms that have a 
real presence in the economy, such as foreign firms in the manufacturing sector. 
However, this would not be consistent with ESA2010 and, instead, we must make 
do with adjusting the published data to take account of the problem. 
 
Finally, the problem with aircraft leasing will make the interpretation of the 
movements in the current account much more difficult to interpret. Because of 
the large size of the gross flows associated with aircraft leasing it may be 
necessary to separate out leasing income and the flow of aircraft imports and to 
adjust the current account to arrive at a more meaningful aggregate for policy 
purposes. Certainly crude use of the current account balance in the EU 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure could give rise to serious 
misinterpretation of what is actually happening in the Irish economy. 
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Irish Quarterly Macroeconomic Data:  
A Volatility Analysis 
*Niall Conroy49 
1. Introduction 
This Note presents an updated assessment of the volatility of Irish quarterly 
macroeconomic data from 1997 Q1 to 2014 Q3. This Note follows McCarthy 
(2003) in highlighting the volatility of Irish quarterly macroeconomic data in an 
international context. The quarter-to-quarter volatility in real macroeconomic 
aggregates, including gross output (GDP) and gross income (GNP), remain 
extremely high for the Irish data. The volatility in the Irish data is greater than 
that displayed by all other OECD countries, except Iceland. This highlights the 
caution required when interpreting quarterly changes in annualised growth rates. 
This high level of volatility, combined with large revisions poses challenges for 
forecasters and policymakers.  
 
Volatility in macroeconomic data comes from two main sources. Firstly, actual 
volatility in the Irish economy which is picked up in the quarterly data and 
secondly, measurement error which may also arise. The fact that this is a small 
open economy with a large financial sector can impact on both of these sources 
of volatility. So “data volatility” in the Note, refers to both actual volatility in the 
economy and also possible measurement error in the data.  
 
2. Macroeconomic Indicators 
When examining Irish macroeconomic data one must choose whether to focus on 
GDP or GNP. While internationally the differences between the two are often 
trivial, the same cannot be said for Ireland. Figure 1 highlights how unusual 
Ireland is in having such a large gap between GNP and GDP. This large gap has 
been previously highlighted by McCarthy (2003) amongst others, and it remains 
the case. With this in mind we use both GDP and GNP to compare Ireland to 
other OECD countries.  
                                                          
49
  Thanks to Alan Barrett, Dawn Holland, Niall McInerney and Michael Connolly (CSO) for comments on a previous draft. 
Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author. 
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As has been highlighted in recent Quarterly Economic Commentaries, GNP is 
considered a better indicator of Irish domestic activity, mainly due to the 
activities of multi-national corporations (MNCs) distorting GDP figures. It has also 
been noted that recent movements in GNP have been more consistent with data 
from Quarterly National Household Surveys and income tax receipts.  
 
Recent issues surrounding the patent cliff, as highlighted by FitzGerald (2013a), 
have shown the impact MNCs can have on GDP while leaving GNP unchanged. 
While GNP may be considered a better measure of domestic economic activity, it 
is also not immune from accounting issues. FitzGerald (2013b) highlights the 
impact of redomiciled plcs on Irish statistics, distorting GNP but having no impact 
on GDP.  
 
FIGURE 1 GDP as a Per Cent of GNP (2013) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat, CSO, World Bank and FRED. 
 
 
In Figure 2 we can see the evolution of the GDP/GNP ratio in Ireland through 
time. We can also see that from the mid 1980s onwards there has been a gap in 
excess of 10 per cent between GDP and GNP. The ongoing presence of a large 
MNC sector in Ireland means that a large gap is likely to remain over the medium 
term.  
 
Due to international convention, GDP is generally used for international 
comparison. However, given the large differences in the two measures in an Irish 
context, one can get quite different estimates of government debt or deficits to 
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GDP/GNP. Growth accounting and productivity estimates may also yield different 
results in an Irish context if either GDP or GNP is used.  
 
FIGURE 2 GDP/GNP Ratio, 1970-2013 
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Source:  CSO National Income and Expenditure Accounts 2013 and National Accounts Historical Series. 
 
3. Irish Macroeconomic Data in an International Context 
Since the CSO’s Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) data run from 1997 Q1, we 
can assess the volatility of Irish data over a number of different periods. The data 
used are seasonally adjusted by the CSO and are expressed in constant (2012) 
prices. In following McCarthy (2003), the implied annualised growth rates of GDP 
and GNP is examined. These annualised growth rates show us what the growth 
would be if the present quarterly growth rate were maintained for a year. To do 
this, the following formula is used: 100*[            ], where g is the 
quarter-on-quarter growth rate of national output or income.  
 
The volatility of Irish quarterly macroeconomic data is evident in Figure 3, which 
plots the annualised growth rates of both GDP and GNP. 
 
While volatility is an important aspect of macroeconomic data, revisions are also 
important in an Irish context. Revisions to the Irish Annual National Accounts 
have been analysed by Ruane (1975). More recently, revisions to the QNA have 
been assessed by Casey and Smyth (2015) Quill (2008) and Bermingham (2006). 
Quill finds that revisions to the levels of GDP are not statistically significant, while 
Bermingham finds that revisions to the growth rates of GDP can be predicted by 
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using the initial estimate of GDP and equity prices. Casey and Smyth find that 
while revisions are not predictable, they are large relative to other OECD 
economies even after controlling for cross-country differences in growth rates. 
This highlights the caution with which forecasters and policymakers should treat 
initial QNA releases.  
 
FIGURE 3 Annualised Growth Rates of GDP and GNP (1997 Q1 - 2014 Q3) 
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Source:  CSO Quarterly National Accounts and author’s calculations. 
 
 
Following McCarthy (2003), the mean absolute deviation (MAD) is used to 
analyse the volatility of the Irish and international data. The MAD takes the 
average absolute change in the quarterly annualised growth rates (as described 
earlier) from one quarter to another. For example, a country which had an 
annualised growth rate of 3 per cent last quarter and now has an annualised 
growth rate of minus 1 per cent has a MAD of four percentage points. We may 
expect that countries with higher average growth rates may have more volatile 
data. With this in mind we plot (in Figure 4) the MAD against the average growth 
rate50 for each of the OECD countries.51 
                                                          
50
 A possible extension to this work would be to attempt to model the cross country variation in the MAD. 
51
 Reliable quarterly data for Greece is no longer available hence it is excluded.  
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FIGURE 4 Mean Absolute Deviation and Growth Rates. OECD Countries (1997 Q1 - 2014 Q2) 
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Source:  CSO, OECD and authors calculations. 
 
Firstly, we can see that there is a positive correlation between average growth 
rates and the MAD in the data. Even given Ireland’s above average growth rate 
for this period, the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates is quite high. We can 
also see that Iceland appears to be something of an outlier, with a mean absolute 
deviation of over 16 percentage points. Excluding Iceland, Ireland has the most 
volatile macroeconomic data in the OECD. We can see that Luxembourg, another 
small open economy with a large financial sector, also has a high level of data 
volatility.  
 
The mean absolute deviation of growth rates in Ireland are 10.06 percentage 
points (GDP) and 9.82 percentage points (GNP). This means that from quarter to 
quarter, the average absolute swing in the annualised rate of growth is ten 
percentage points. While this is high, it is slightly lower than the 11 to 13 
percentage point range found in McCarthy (2003).  
 
Given the dramatic turns in Ireland’s economic fortunes in the last decade, it is 
worth considering if our data volatility is driven mainly by recent events. With this 
in mind we present an eight quarter moving average of the MAD of GDP and GNP 
data in Ireland.  
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FIGURE 5 Eight Quarter Moving Averages of the Mean Absolute Deviation 
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Source:  CSO Quarterly National Accounts and author’s calculations. 
 
We can see that there does seem to be an elevated level of volatility around 
possible turning points in the business cycle. However, these instances alone do 
not explain Ireland’s highly volatile quarterly data. It is worth noting that the 
minimum levels of volatility presented here (4 to 6 per cent) are still well above 
many OECD countries volatility levels. This, coupled with the high levels of 
revisions found by  Casey and Smyth (2015), shows the difficulty faced by 
policymakers and forecasters when examining the QNA. Models that use a range 
of indicators, such as nowcasting methodologies (see Byrne et al., 2014), may be 
less sensitive to these issues. This is because factor models that take common 
factors from a range of sources give a better indication of the underlying 
movements in the economy. 
 
4. Sources of Volatility 
Broad sectoral estimates of GDP are provided by the CSO and these can be used 
to identify sectors that may be driving this high level of volatility. These are 
shown in Table 1 below.  
 
It is apparent that all sectors except “other services” and “public administration 
and defence” have quite high levels of volatility. The high levels of volatility in 
agriculture and construction sectors may be ignored as they make up a small 
share of GDP. This leaves other industrial sectors and the distribution sector as 
the principal sources of volatility. While McCarthy (2003) highlighted the issues in 
some manufacturing industries, we can see that the volatility in the national 
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accounts is no longer solely due to activities in the manufacturing sector. It is 
noticeable however, that the two sectors most responsible for the high levels of 
volatility have a significant MNC presence.   
 
TABLE 1  Sectoral MADs and Shares of GDP (1997 Q1 - 2014 Q3) 
Sector MAD (%) Average Share 
of GDP (%) 
Agriculture Forestry and Fishing 27.293 3.0 
Industry - Building and Construction. 14.679 3.2 
Industry - All other industry. 31.320 26.0 
Distribution, Transport, Software and Communication 19.889 25.9 
Public Administration and Defence 4.825 4.4 
Other Services (including Rent) 7.093 37.7 
Net factor income 64.717 N/A 
Source:  CSO Quarterly National Accounts, December 2014, Table 1. 
 
We have seen that there is little difference in the average level of volatility of the 
GDP and GNP data for Ireland, with both being well above other OECD countries. 
However, the difference between the two (net factor income from abroad) is 
extremely volatile itself, with a mean absolute deviation of 73 percentage points. 
This shows how the magnitude of the once-off measures can impact on GDP or 
GNP. 
 
While attention has been given to sectors on the supply side that might be 
responsible for the elevated levels of volatility, focus now turns to the demand 
side. In Table 3 of the QNA we have a breakdown of seasonally-adjusted real GDP 
into the expenditure items shown below.  
 
TABLE 2  Expenditure Items MADs and Shares of GDP (1997 Q1 - 2014 Q3) 
Sector MAD (%) Average share of 
GDP (%) 
Personal Expenditure on Consumer Goods and Services 7.187 49.4 
Net Expenditure by Central and Local Government 10.470 17.0 
Investment 45.942 21.3 
Imports 17.257 -82.0 
Exports 13.060 93.7 
Note:  Averages do not sum to 100 due to value changes in stocks. 
Source:   CSO Quarterly National Accounts, December 2014, Table 3. 
 
We can see that both consumption and net government expenditure exhibit 
lower levels of volatility than investment, imports and exports. This should be 
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kept in mind when seeking reliable indicators of turning points in the business 
cycle. It should be kept in mind that both investment and imports/exports are 
heavily influenced by the activities of MNC. Casey and Smyth (2015) previously 
highlighted that the investment and net exports items were the most heavily 
revised in Irish Quarterly National Accounts.  
 
One additional factor that may be driving the volatility of Irish macroeconomic 
data is credit levels. Ireland recently experienced, even by international 
standards, a large credit boom (see Kelly, 2009). In this context, it is worth 
considering possible spillover effects from this credit boom to the volatility of 
Irish macroeconomic aggregates.  
 
The impacts of credit markets on business cycle fluctuations have been previously 
documented. Mendicino (2007) claims that better developed credit markets 
(proxied by size) lead to reduced business cycle volatility. However, large 
increases in credit may indicate an increased probability of tight credit conditions 
ahead and hence a more volatile business cycle. Further work on the relationship 
between credit and output volatility is needed to establish potential directions of 
causality and possible non-linearities in these effects.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This Note finds that Ireland still has highly volatile quarterly macroeconomic data. 
It again highlights both the caution required when interpreting quarter-on-
quarter changes in growth rates and the difficulty in identifying turning points in 
the Irish economy. While we find that both GDP and GNP are quite volatile, the 
difference between the two (net factor income from abroad) is also extremely 
volatile. This highlights both the importance of choosing the macro indicator and 
the impact MNCs have on national accounting aggregates.  
 
While we also find that there are elevated levels of volatility around recent 
turning points in the business cycle, these alone do not explain Ireland’s elevated 
levels of volatility. 
 
These estimates are comparable with those found by McCarthy (2003). However 
the results show that the sources of volatility are now not just due to 
developments in the manufacturing sector, but are also apparent in the 
distribution, transport, software and communication sector. Similarly on the 
expenditure side, investment, imports and exports are found to be highly volatile, 
with consumption and government expenditure less so. The increasing number of 
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sectors displaying volatility may be due to the greater presence of MNC’s 
throughout the Irish economy. 
 
The high levels of volatility and often large revisions to the Quarterly National 
Accounts highlight the difficulties faced by policymakers and forecasters. With 
such a degree of uncertainty around the state of the economy at any moment in 
time, forecasters are challenged to present a coherent picture of the economy. 
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The KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment 
Index 
*David Duffy, Ciara Morley and Dorothy Watson52 
6. Introduction 
Since 2002 KBC Bank and the ESRI have published a monthly Consumer Sentiment 
Index, building on a dataset that dates back to February 1996. Across many 
countries, consumer sentiment is a commonly used indicator of consumer 
spending, which is an important element of economic growth. Trends in this 
component are important for forecasting and planning. In Ireland, the Consumer 
Sentiment Index has been used as an input into macro-economic modelling and 
has also been shown to perform well as a leading indicator of economic trends. 
Recently, the Consumer Sentiment Index has been used in the ’Nowcasting’ 
model which forms an input to the short-term forecasts of the Quarterly 
Economic Commentary.  
 
In the US, measures of consumer confidence by the University of Michigan and 
the Conference Board receive much attention, both domestically within the US 
but also internationally. Such indicators have a broader use than solely as an 
input to model-based forecasts. By providing some barometer of consumer 
sentiment, they are an additional piece of information that may be used by those 
analysing, or interested in, the health of the economy. In an Irish context, Goggin 
(2008)53 tested the relationship between the Consumer Sentiment Index and 
official data such as GDP, unemployment and personal expenditure and finds 
some forecasting potential, particularly with regard to the overall trend.  
 
This note provides an overview of trends in the KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer 
Sentiment Index for Ireland and its two key sub-indices since 1996. We also 
outline some developments in how the data are collected and provide some 
detail on the new Dublin Consumer Sentiment Index, which is derived from the 
same survey dataset.  
                                                          
52 
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7. What does the KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index Show? 
Monthly data for the KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index are available 
from February 1996. Figure 1 displays the three-month moving average 
Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) as well as the three-month moving average of 
two sub-indices; the Index of Current Expectations (ICE) and the Index of Current 
Conditions (ICC). Each of these sub-indices is based on a different combination of 
a sub-set of the five components of the sentiment index. The ICE is based on 
consumers’ perceptions of their future financial situation, their economic outlook 
for the country as a whole and expectations about employment in Ireland. For 
this reason it is viewed as a forward-looking index providing some insight into 
consumer expectation. The other main sub-index, the ICC is based on how 
consumers feel about their current financial circumstances compared to 12 
months ago, as well as their perception of the current buying environment for 
large household purchases. Therefore, this index is used to provide insight into 
how consumers view current economic conditions. A similar approach is used in 
the production of other sentiment indices such as the consumer confidence 
measure produced by the University of Michigan and the EU Commission. 
 
The survey provides us with a measure of consumer sentiment over a period 
when there were substantial changes in the Irish economy – the Celtic Tiger era 
and the boom and bust of the 2000s. From Figure 1 it is clear to see that over the 
19-year period, the three indices follow broadly similar trends. It is noteworthy 
that during periods of strong economic growth, or ‘boom’ periods, the indices 
move very closely together. This is to be expected as consumers will tend to feel 
positive about all aspects of the economy, including their own personal financial 
situation, during periods of strong growth. This is most obvious in the period prior 
to the dot-com crash in 1999-2001 and to a lesser extent a similar trend is also 
observed in the 2003-2007 period. The relationship appears weaker during 
periods widely accepted as ‘bust’ or recessionary periods, such as the early 2000s 
and most notably during the most recent crisis period from 2008. In these periods 
consumer expectations would appear to be more adversely affected as 
consumers become more uncertain about the outlook for their finances, the 
labour market and the economy.  
 
The data also suggest a shift in the indices in early 2006 prior to the property and 
financial crash. In all three indices, the decline began in January 2006 some two 
years before the impact of the Great Recession. This suggests that, prior to the 
crash, consumers were becoming more guarded in their view of future 
expectations as well as becoming more tentative regarding their current financial 
situation. It is difficult to determine the exact reasons for this decline in 2006 but 
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it may be related to media coverage of concerns from the OECD and Central Bank 
that the Irish property market was overvalued by some 20 to 60 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 1 Consumer Sentiment Index (three-month moving average, Q4 1995 = 100) 
 
Source: ESRI. 
 
Between the peak of sentiment in early 2005 and the trough in August 2008, the 
ICE experienced the largest decline, falling by 75 index points. In comparison, the 
overall sentiment index declined by just over 60 index points. This suggests that 
consumers’ perception of the outlook for the economy, their own financial 
situation and employment opportunities became much more negative. Indeed 
consumer perception of employment opportunities and future financial situation 
declined by 104 and 74 index points respectively – the largest falls of all five of 
the main sentiment components.  
 
Undoubtedly there is monthly volatility in the Irish consumer index, although this 
is not unusual and is similar to both the US and EU confidence measures. This is 
primarily due to changing expectations, with a lower level of change evident in 
consumers’ perceptions of their current conditions. Despite this monthly 
volatility, when we graph the three-month moving average (as depicted in Figure 
1), which smoothes out some of this volatility, over the long-run it is much easier 
to determine the trends in sentiment. Since the trough of mid-2008, the overall 
trend in each of the indices suggests a positive improvement in consumer 
sentiment. This is also reflected by the fact that each of the three indices has 
recovered almost all of the losses incurred over the recent crisis period. 
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Across the 19 years of data available, most variation occurs in the component 
regarding consumers’ view of employment opportunities in the next 12 months. 
The employment component reached a peak of 201 index points in early 2000 
when the economy was at close to full employment. Over subsequent years 
consumers’ perception of the outlook for the labour market became more 
negative, with the index declining to a low of just 6.4 index points in March 2009. 
Given the impact of the economic downturn on the economy and the labour 
market, with a sharp rise in unemployment, consumers were finding it very 
difficult to remain optimistic about future employment opportunities.  
 
8. How the Data are Collected54 
The data used to construct the indices are taken from a nationally representative 
telephone survey carried out by the ESRI on a monthly basis, with a sample size of 
800 respondents, since April 2008. A fresh national sample is used each month. 
Post-stratification is used in selecting the person to be interviewed in each 
household based on gender, age group and employment situation. The numbers 
required in each category are based on national figures from the Quarterly 
National Household Survey. In practice, this involves interviewers (once they 
make contact with a household) asking to speak, in particular, to someone in the 
‘difficult to reach’ groups, such as men, younger adults and people with full-time 
jobs. 
 
For the landline part of the survey, we find that on average about 19 per cent of 
numbers selected are valid private household numbers which are answered and 
where there is someone in the household eligible for interview (that is, in the 
age/gender/economic status group for which the required number of interviews 
has not yet been completed). Among these contacted numbers, the response 
rate in terms of completed questionnaires was 53 per cent in 2013. The large 
majority of the non-respondents are refusals. There are also numbers where no 
contact was made. In calculating an overall response rate, we need to make an 
assumption about whether or not these numbers are valid household numbers. If 
we assume that the eligibility rate is the same among the non-contacted numbers 
as among those where eligibility has been determined, the response rate was 
estimated at 41 per cent for the landline sample in 2013.55 
 
                                                          
54
  Details of the survey methodology are given in the Appendix. 
55
  The eligibility rate (E) is calculated as E = (C+R)/(C+R+I), where C=number completed; R=number refusals and other 
non-response (due to illness etc) and I = number ineligible (out of service, not a residential address). It is assumed 
that this percentage of the non-contacted number would have been eligible. The response rate (RR) is calculated as 
C/(C+R+ENC), where C=number completed; R=number refusals and other non-response (due to illness etc) and ENC = 
the estimated number of eligible non-contacts.  
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The introduction of a mobile telephone sample 
Since September 2013, the survey has included a mobile-only sample. The mobile 
telephone sample is designed to complete a minimum of 125 interviews each 
month with people who have a mobile telephone but who do not have a landline 
in the home. This group has increased in size and is particularly important among 
young adults. For the mobile telephone sample, we have an additional screening 
criterion in that we wish to include only those who do not also have a landline in 
the home. On average in 2013 we have found that only 9 per cent of the 
contacted numbers (5 per cent of the numbers dialled) connect to a person who 
is eligible to be interviewed.56 Of the connected calls to a person known to be 
eligible, 52 per cent complete the interview. If we assume that the eligibility rate 
is the same for the ‘unknown eligibility’ telephone numbers (non-contacts, early 
refusers) as among those where eligibility has been determined, and re-calculate 
the response rate on this basis, it was 26 per cent for the mobile sample in 2013. 
 
Putting together the figures for the landline sample and the mobile sample, the 
response rate for the months in 2013 where both are included (i.e. from 
September onwards) is 53 per cent of the contacted numbers known to be 
eligible and 37 per cent when re-calculated to take account of the likely eligibility 
rate among the non-contacts. 
 
When the survey has been completed, the structure of the completed sample is 
calibrated against population totals in terms of gender, age group, marital status, 
level of education, economic status and region. This is done to ensure that the 
calculated indices are representative of the national population.57 
 
9. Dublin Consumer Sentiment Index 
In late 2014 the Institute was asked by Dublin City Council to examine the 
feasibility of constructing a sentiment index for the Dublin region. Increasingly 
there is an interest in the performance of different regions and Morgenroth 
(2014) has shown that the regions perform differently with regard to output 
levels, employment growth and the unemployment rate.58 Beginning in the first 
quarter of 2015, a Consumer Sentiment Index for the Dublin region is now 
produced. The Dublin Consumer Sentiment Index is calculated using the same 
methodology as the KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index. However, to 
                                                          
56
  This does not include the 17 per cent of dialled numbers where the person refuses before the interviewer can 
determine whether they are eligible (i.e. whether they are aged over 16 and have no landline telephone in the home). 
57
  Details of how the index is constructed are available online at www.esri.ie.  
58
  Morgenroth, E. (2014). “Two-speed recovery? Spatial development in Ireland”, ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Research Note 2014/4/2. 
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ensure that the Dublin Index is representative of the Dublin region, a new set of 
weights was constructed taking account of the age and sex of the population. In 
the process of constructing the new weights, the latest data available were used, 
including adjustments to the QNHS data following the censuses of 2006 and 
2011. Therefore, the Dublin index is not directly comparable to the published 
national index which was weighted based on the data available at the time of 
publication.  
 
Figure 2 shows the Dublin Consumer Sentiment Index following a similar trend to 
that of the national index. The Dublin index peaked in the first quarter of 2005 
and reached a trough in Quarter 2, 2009. The impact of entry to the bailout 
programme is evident in the latter half of 2010. Over recent quarters the Dublin 
index has followed a broadly upward trend, although there has been some 
volatility. The Dublin Consumer Sentiment Index increased in the first quarter of 
2015 to 148.9 from 132.1 in the final quarter of 2014. The improvement in Dublin 
sentiment was broadly based, with all five components of the survey increasing 
relative to the previous quarter (and compared to the first quarter of 2014). The 
Dublin consumer sentiment reading for the first quarter of 2015 is the highest in 
the history of the Dublin series which stretches back to 2003.  
 
FIGURE 2 Dublin Consumer Sentiment Index (2003 = 100) 
 
Source: ESRI. 
 
The improvement in consumer sentiment in Dublin in recent times has been 
primarily the result of more positive expectations. In the first quarter of 2015 the 
proportion of Dublin consumers expecting the economic situation to get better in 
the next 12 months reached 68 per cent compared to 58 per cent in the final 
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three months of 2014. Consumers are also more positive about the outlook for 
their personal finances with 30 per cent expecting an improvement in the next 12 
months. 
 
TABLE 1 Survey Index Results (2003 = 100) 
 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2014 
Dublin Consumer Sentiment Index 130.6 131.0 134.3 132.1 
Dublin Index of Current Conditions 90.6 95.8 92.3 92.7 
Dublin Index of Consumer Expectations 173.9 169.3 179.8 174.8 
Source: ESRI. 
 
Data for Quarter 1 2015 suggest that, on balance, the household finances of 
Dublin consumers weakened in the past 12 months but the breadth of 
deterioration was notably smaller than in previous quarters and with a modest 
improvement in financial circumstances envisaged in the next year, there has 
been some improvement in the buying climate of late. As a result, there has been 
an increase in the current conditions reported by Dublin consumers in the early 
months of 2015. However, this has been more muted than the rise in their 
expectations. 
 
10. Summary 
The KBC Bank/ESRI monthly Consumer Sentiment Index provides a useful insight 
into how consumers perceive their personal financial circumstances as well as the 
broader economic climate. The main underlying questions also help us to track 
how consumers feel about their current financial situation and how they expect 
prospects to develop over the next 12 months. These five components of the 
survey can provide a lot of insight into the main sentiment index which tends to 
vary substantially from one month to the next.  
 
In addition, we now, on a quarterly basis, provide a Consumer Sentiment Index 
for Dublin. The availability of the index for Dublin opens the possibility for further 
research on some of the regional aspects of economic trends which might be 
linked to movements in other indicators available at a regional level such as 
house prices and unemployment. In recent years, items, such as house prices for 
example, have increased at a much faster rate within Dublin compared to the rest 
of the country. Therefore some insight may be drawn on how consumer 
sentiment within the capital is trending and how it is linked to these other 
economic outcomes. 
 
88 | Qua rt er ly  Econom ic  Comme nt ary  –  Sum me r 2 01 5  
Since 2002 the KBC Bank/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index has provided a 
measure of consumer confidence in Ireland, as well as a measure of perceptions 
of the current situation and consumer expectations. Over time the survey 
methodology has been adapted to include households that only have a mobile 
telephone. More recently, the Consumer Sentiment Index has been used in the 
‘Nowcasting’ model which forms an input to the short-term forecasts of the 
Quarterly Economic Commentary.   
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Appendix 
Since the sample has two components (a landline sample and a mobile telephone 
sample) there are two distinct selection processes. The landline sample is 
selected in three stages: 
 25 primary sampling units (or areas) are selected from the GeoDirectory 
(a listing of all addresses in Ireland), using random sampling with implicit 
stratification by urban/rural location, socio-economic characteristics of 
the area and age structure of the population in the area. 
 A set of start addresses is selected at random within each area. 
 The addresses are used to look up a telephone number, which is then 
used to generate a bank of 100 numbers. 
 The interviewers dial each number up to four times at different times of 
day and days of the week in an attempt to make contact. 
 Once contact is made at the household, the interviewers select the 
respondent at the household level, using post-stratification controls by 
gender, broad age group and economic status. Interviewers are required 
to complete a set number of questionnaires in each area, with a given 
number of adults in each gender, age and economic status category.  
 
The mobile sample is selected by Amárach Research59 as follows: 
 A simple random sample of mobile telephone numbers is selected from a 
set of numbers maintained by Amárach research drawn from nationally 
representative address-based samples.  
 From each number a bank of 100 numbers is generated. 
 Once the interviewer makes contact with the number, it is screened to 
ensure that a) the person answering is aged 16 or over and b) lives at an 
address that does not have a landline. Where these two criteria are met, 
the person is invited to complete the interview.  
 
                                                          
59
  A consulting and market research company. 
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Standard Variable Rate (SVR) Pass-Through 
in the Irish Mortgage Market: An Updated 
Assessment 
*Kieran McQuinn and Ciara Morley1 
1. Introduction 
In this note we re-examine the “pass-through” relationship between the 
European Central Bank (ECB) policy rate and the standard mortgage variable rate 
(SVR) charged by Irish credit institutions. The issue, which was examined in some 
detail by Goggin et al. (2012), has attracted renewed interest in recent times 
owing to the continued observed difference between the SVR and the rate of 
interest charged on other variable rate mortgages in the Irish market. 
 
The Irish mortgage market consists of loans issued at both fixed and variable 
rates of interest. However, the latter form of finance dominates with over 85 per 
cent of loans issued at variable rates.  
 
There are two types of variable rates: “Tracker” mortgages, which were 
particularly popular during the boom period, are linked contractually to the ECB 
policy rate. Therefore, when the ECB rate changes, the tracker rate changes 
automatically. SVRs (which are variable rates other than trackers) are not 
specifically linked to an underlying market or wholesale rate. The lender may 
change this rate at their discretion.  
 
Consequently, with so many mortgages financed with either tracker or standard 
variable rates, particularly when compared with other European countries, the 
Irish mortgage book is more vulnerable to changes in the policy rate.  
 
However, the relationship between the policy, tracker and standard variable rate 
has been complicated considerably by the aftermath of the financial crisis. The 
relatively large presence of tracker mortgages on the balance sheets of some Irish 
financial institutions has had significant implications for the profitability of these 
                                                          
1
  We would like to acknowledge the comments of Alan Barrett and Seán Lyons (ESRI) on an earlier draft. Any remaining 
errors are the responsibilities of the authors. 
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banks. As the cost of funding these mortgages increased substantially after the 
financial crisis, these products were no longer offered to prospective customers.  
 
The emergence of the wedge between the policy rate and the SVR comes in the 
context of the response of the monetary authorities to the financial crisis; in 
September of 2014, for example, the ECB announced the lowering of its main 
refinancing rate to a historic low of 0.05 per cent. In Figure 1 we plot the actual 
ECB policy rate and the average SVR for the Irish mortgage market over the 
period 2005 to 2014. The change in the relationship between the two rates is 
evident from 2009 onwards. 
 
Goggin et al. (2012) assess the “pass-through” relationship between the ECB 
policy rate and SVRs for a number of leading Irish domestic institutions over the 
period 1999 to 2011 and find clear evidence of a “break” in the relationship at the 
end of 2008. Namely, in the lead up to the financial crisis, a close relationship 
existed between the policy rate and the variable rate. However, thereafter, this 
relationship appeared to weaken considerably.  
 
Goggin et al. (2012) also posit reasons for the increasing wedge observed. They 
argue, in the main, profitability considerations are the key reason for distortions 
in the pass-through relationship. Relevant factors, in that regard, are funding 
costs, the degree of competition in the retail market and the degree of mortgage 
arrears on the balance sheets of Irish institutions.  
 
From a competition perspective, if there were enough competitors in the market 
one might expect margins to be competed down to some extent.  But if there is 
no entry and no effective competition, lenders are in a tight oligopoly.  This is 
likely to reduce the extent of pass-through, and has been shown to do so by 
international authors (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2013).  The fall-out from the 
financial crisis has made the possibility of households switching from one 
mortgage provider to another more difficult for those with existing mortgages. It 
has also reduced the number of institutions active in the market and made entry 
more difficult as there are few housing transactions requiring new loans.   
 
In the more recent period, the size of the wedge between the SVR and the policy 
rate appears to be also influenced by the amount of impaired mortgage loans 
carried by an individual bank. Therefore, it would appear that the most effective 
way to repair the monetary transmission mechanism in the domestic market is to 
improve competition in the domestic banking sector, while also addressing the 
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structural issues which are still afflicting the balance sheets of Irish credit 
institutions. 
 
In this paper, in light of the increased attention devoted to this issue recently, we 
update some of the empirical work conducted in Goggin et al. (2012). Their 
sample period covered the period 1999-2011; however over the past number of 
years, it is likely that many of the trends which emerged immediately post-2008, 
have, if anything been exacerbated. Therefore, we think there is significant merit 
in revisiting this issue with data up to the end of 2014. We also discuss some of 
the conclusions of Goggin et al. (2012) in terms of the relevant policy implications 
which arise.  
 
The rest of the note is structured as follows; in the next section we update 
previous estimates of the pass-through of the ECB policy rate to the Irish market, 
we then discuss the policy implications of the reasons proposed by Goggin et al. 
(2012) as determinants of the wedge between the policy rate and the SVR. A final 
section offers some concluding comments. 
 
2. Modelling Framework 
For customers with tracker interest rates in the Irish market, the change in 
mortgage servicing costs of an increase in the ECB policy rate is easily assessed. 
Owing to the contractual link between tracker rates and the ECB rate, these rates 
are automatically affected by changes in the official rate. Thus a tracker rate, 
typically, would be the policy rate plus a fixed margin of, say, 100 basis points 
above the policy rate. SVRs, on the other hand, are set with no specific link to an 
underlying market or wholesale rate and the lender in question can choose to 
increase or decrease the rate at its discretion. 
 
We revisit the empirical application in Goggin et al. (2012) and re-estimate the 
following pass-through panel data model using quarterly observations over the 
period 1999 to 2014. The panel model, which follows the marginal cost pricing 
model outlined by Rousseas (1985) specifies retail lending rates as a function of 
the cost of funds and a mark-up, which is typically referred to as the interest rate 
spread. 
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      is institution i's standard variable rate,      is the ECB policy rate and 
      is the institution-specific fixed effect. Note we also include an interaction 
term between the institution-specific dummy and the policy rate to examine 
whether the degree of pass-through varies across the different institutions. The 
model is now estimated over the period 1999 to 2014. 
 
Following Goggin et al. (2012) we initially conduct two estimations: one for the 
entire period and a second for the sub-sample period 1999 Q1 to 2008 Q4. The 
results are in Tables 1 and 2. From the table it can be observed that the 
coefficient on the policy variable (0.05) suggests that the policy variable has a 
relatively small influence on the SVR of individual institutions. We find that there 
are individual bank-specific effects as the dummies for the banks are all 
significant. However, there does not appear to be any significant difference 
across the institutions in terms of the pass-through effect irrespective of the two 
different sample periods; the coefficients on the interactive dummies between 
the banks and policy rates are all insignificant. 
 
In Table 2, we repeat the same estimation except this time for the sub-period 
1999 Q1 to 2008 Q4. There is a sizeable difference in the pass-through rate with 
the coefficient on the policy variable now 0.57. The model also fits the data much 
better with a significantly higher      . Clearly a sizeable change has occurred in the 
pass-through rate over the two periods.  
 
Similarly, if we compare the estimates in Table 1, with estimates of the pass-
through rate for the sub-period 1999 Q1-2012 Q4 estimated in Goggin et al. 
(2012) (Table 3), we see that the pass-through rate has also declined over the 
past three years; the coefficient on the policy variable for this period is 0.184.  
 
3. Reasons for the Wedge? 
In general over the entire sample period 1999-2011, Goggin et al. (2012) find a 
number of factors impacting the pass-through relationship between the ECB 
policy rate and the SVR. They find strong evidence to support competition effects; 
the lower the level of competition in the market, the higher the mortgage 
interest rate. For example, the introduction of Bank of Scotland had a significant 
impact on the residential mortgage market in 1999, when, following the banks 
entry into the Irish market, mortgage rates were reduced by up to 100 basis 
points.  
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Post-2008, one of the main factors cited for the breakdown in the pass-through 
relationship is the importance of crisis-related measures of funding costs such as 
the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee (ELG) fee and Eonia spreads. The ELG, introduced 
in December 2009, provided a guarantee by the Irish State for certain liabilities of 
a number of credit institutions. As such it was one of a number of measures 
introduced in the aftermath of the financial crisis to generate confidence and 
stability in the Irish financial sector.2 The Eonia spread captures financial market 
uncertainty and risk, which increases funding costs for banks. Both the ELG and 
the Eonia spread increased funding costs over and above the policy rate. 
 
Furthermore, Goggin et al. (2012) contend that costs associated with increased 
credit risk were an increasingly important factor in setting variable rates post-
2008. Credit institutions with higher rates of mortgage arrears tend to exhibit 
higher variable rates. This suggests that some lenders are charging higher variable 
rates to compensate for the losses being incurred due to the presence of tracker 
loans. Goggin et al. (2012) also find evidence to suggest that banks which have 
higher shares of tracker loans on their books have higher rates. 
 
Ongoing balance sheet difficulties, however, are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for persistent high lending margins.  In a competitive market, loans that become 
“impaired” would be marked to market and these losses would be realised.  If 
they weren’t, financial institutions from outside the market would enter and 
“cherry pick” the good quality loans until the incumbent institutions either failed 
or altered their standard variable rates. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that the most effective way for the continuing 
wedge between the different mortgage variable interest rates to be remedied is 
for a more efficient resolution of the mortgage arrears issue and greater 
competition within the domestic banking sector. 
 
These results find significant resonance in the international literature. For 
example, in assessing interest rate setting across different countries, Pautkuri 
(2010), Cecchin (2011), Gambacorta (2004), De Graeve et al. (2007) and Van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) include factors such as banks’ costs, competition, risk, 
capital, structural breaks, non-linearities (menu costs and switching costs) and 
asymmetric adjustment. To varying degrees, they find a role for all of these 
factors in explaining the pass-through relationship. Most of these papers use 
panel data and find that the pass-through relationship can vary considerably 
                                                          
2 
 More information on the scheme is available from the Irish Department of Finance: 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=7071. 
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across institutions, even after including a range of institution-specific controls. 
Raknerud et al. (2011) use a dynamic factor model to analyse the effect of banks’ 
funding costs on retail rates in Norway. The results point to incomplete pass-
through and that, when market funding costs increase, banks’ net interest 
margins decrease. However, there is considerable heterogeneity between 
institutions, with those that have a large share of market financing more 
vulnerable to increases in the market rate. Finally, short-term deposits and 
lending have been shown to exhibit quicker and more complete pass-through 
than longer-term ones (e.g. De Bondt, 2005). 
 
4. Concluding Comments 
The persistence of the relationship between the ECB policy rate and key interest 
rates in the Irish mortgage market highlights the extent to which the domestic 
economy is still suffering the after-effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
The results presented here, along with earlier analysis of this issue, indicate that 
the wedge between the policy rate and the SVR owes much to the weak levels of 
competition currently within the Irish financial sector. Furthermore, the 
continuing and growing nature of this wedge underscores the need for domestic 
credit institutions, currently in the market, to accelerate the speed at which 
impaired balance sheets are being repaired. 
 
Since 2012, it would appear that the non-standard monetary policy measures of 
the ECB have had no discernible impact on repairing the transmission 
mechanism; in that regard, it will be interesting to see if the recent adoption of 
quantitative easing by the ECB will lead to any improvement in the pass-through 
relationship. 
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TABLE 1  Results from Updated Panel Data Model: Q1 1999 – Q4 2014  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
POL 0.05 0.02 0.07 
Bank 1 1.35 0.03 0.00 
Bank 2 1.40 0.03 0.00 
Bank 3 1.42 0.03 0.00 
Bank 4 1.43 0.03 0.00 
Bank 5 1.46 0.03 0.00 
Bank 1 * POL 0.01 0.03 0.76 
Bank 2 * POL 0.02 0.03 0.50 
Bank 3 * POL 0.00 0.03 0.94 
Bank 5 * POL 0.02 0.03 0.65 
 
      
0.08 
Number of Observations 320 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2  Results from Updated Panel Data Model: Q1 1999 – Q4 2008  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
POL 0.57 0.04 0.0 
Bank 1 0.78 0.05 0.0 
Bank 2 0.88 0.05 0.0 
Bank 3 0.72 0.05 0.0 
Bank 4 0.85 0.05 0.0 
Bank 5 0.82 0.05 0.0 
Bank 1 * POL 0.00 0.06 0.9 
Bank 2 * POL -0.03 0.06 0.6 
Bank 3 * POL 0.08 0.06 0.2 
Bank 5 * POL 0.03 0.06 0.6 
 
      
0.84 
Number of Observations 200 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
 
  
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  Summ er  20 15 | 99 
   
TABLE 3  Results from Updated Panel Data Model: 1999 Q1 – 2012 Q4 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
POL 0.18 0.03 0.00 
Bank 1 1.21 0.04 0.00 
Bank 2 1.26 0.04 0.00 
Bank 3 1.31 0.04 0.00 
Bank 4 1.29 0.04 0.00 
Bank 5 1.38 0.04 0.00 
Bank 1 * POL 0.01 0.05 0.83 
Bank 2 * POL 0.03 0.05 0.58 
Bank 3 * POL -0.03 0.05 0.51 
Bank 5 * POL -0.04 0.05 0.39 
 
      
0.33 
Number of Observations 280 
 
Source:  Authors’ own estimates. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 European Central Bank (ECB) Main Refinancing Rate and the Variable Rate (%) Charged in the Irish 
Mortgage Market: 2005 Q1 - 2015 Q1
 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
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